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ABSTRACT
An Exploratory Study of The Factors Affecting Hospital Performance: Safety, Clinical Care,
Patient Experience, Efficiency and Cost
by
Shevon Lewis
December 2020
Chair: Subhashish Samaddar
Major Academic Unit: Doctorate in Business Administration
Healthcare systems have interrelated, collaborative, and interdependent elements from
the human aspects to facilities geared towards providing people with medical care. This
dissertation explores healthcare reform in the context of hospital value-based purchasing
programs. Hospital performance is a byproduct of a hospital’s characteristics, demonstrated
through organizational behavior—a key driver towards an institution’s overall success and
sustainability. Hospital value-based purchasing (VBP) program is a Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid services (CMS) initiative that rewards acute-care hospitals with incentivized payments
for the quality care provided to Medicare beneficiaries ((HHS), 2017). The program adopts a
philosophy of measurement and promotes an appraisal mechanism to provide equitable
reimbursement for patient care; however, the program has had a marginal influence on hospital
performance. The study aimed to assess hospital performance ‘VBP program’ and provide a
prescriptive guide to decision-makers. Secondary data from 2,786 acute care hospitals across the
united states, which offers inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries, has been used. Statistical
significance was measured by applying bivariate and multivariate regression. The findings
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showed that teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index had an impact on hospital
performance.
INDEX WORDS: Hospital performance, Business performance, Organizational Structure,
Safety, Clinical Care, Patient Experience, Efficiency and Cost; Teaching Intensity,
Hospital Size, Case Mix Index, Value Base Purchasing, Value Base Care, Healthcare
Reform, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
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I
I.1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hospital Value-Based Purchasing and Quality Healthcare
The cost and quality of healthcare have always been a source of contention. The

healthcare system in the United States of America have been characterised by sharply rising
costs and lower quality compared with other industrialized countries (Kavanagh K., 2012).
Disparities in needs among people due to the recurrence of infectious diseases and the rise in
chronic diseases increases the need for specialized treatment and long-term care. Defining the
quality of medical care seems to be almost as elusive as variations in health needs or resources
that do not explain satisfactorily significant variations per population rates of use of services
(Lohr, 1988). Discussions on healthcare reform should highlight the need for population-based
approaches in ensuring consistent quality care for chronic patients, which have become
increasingly popular and funding for pilot projects to test alternative ways of advancing greater
returns on healthcare spending (Greenberg, Dudley, & Ferris, 2010).
Healthcare advancements by contributors have advanced access to health insurance,
innovation in medical research, disease control, technology, and performance-based rewards.
“Pay-for-performance” is an umbrella term for initiatives aimed at improving the quality,
efficiency, and overall value of healthcare (James, 2012). Value-based purchasing (VBP) has
been a widely favored strategy in the improvement of the US healthcare system, which
originated during the 1990s among large employers and business coalitions (Chee, Ryan, &
Wasfy, 2016). VBP began with the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 as a subset of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) program
(Raso, 2013) and was signed into law as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
of 2010 and implemented in 2012. The program aimed at incentivization of inpatient providers to
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deliver high value, as opposed to high-volume, healthcare (Blumenthal, 2013). Value-Based
Purchasing Scores track hospital performance in four quality measures (Waldron, 2019):
• Clinical Care (25%)
• Efficiency and Cost Reduction (25%)
• Patient and Caregiver-Centered Experience of Care/Care Coordination (25%)
• Safety (25%)
Hospitals payment are based on three factors (Waldron, 2019):
•
•
•
I.2

Achievement points: How well a hospital performs on each of the selected measures
Improvement points: How much it has improved on each measure compared to the
baseline period
Consistency points: Rewards hospitals that have scores above the national 50th
percentile in all eight dimensions of the HCAHPS survey
Statement of the Problem
The institutionalization of the Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) program in hospitals

across the United States has had major consequences for how hospitals function and operate.
Statistics have shown that the quality of healthcare has declined, but costs have risen, which may
be a direct consequence of a high rate of competition in order to obtain insurance financing. The
purpose of this study was to assess hospital performance ‘Value-Based Purchasing Program’ and
to provide a prescriptive guide to decision-makers through the analysis of existing operating
system practices in hospitals across the United States.
The U.S. healthcare system operates as a combination of different health insurance
programs. It is only recently that legislation has enacted the provision of healthcare coverage for
nearly all citizens (The U.S. Health Care System: An International Perspective, 2016); even so,
many Americans today are still without health insurance making access to adequate healthcare
challenging. Reports have stated that in 2014, 283.2 million people in the U.S., 89.6 percent had
some type of health insurance, with 66 percent of workers covered by a private health insurance
plan. Among the insured, 115.4 million people, 36.5 percent of the population, received coverage
through the U.S. government in 2014 through Medicare (50.5 million), Medicaid (61.65 million),
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and/or Veterans Administration or other military care (14.14 million) (people may be covered by
more than one government plan). Conversely, nearly 32.9 million people in the U.S. had no
health insurance at the end of 2014 (The U.S. Health Care System: An International Perspective,
2016). Only 2019 saw what can be described as a marginal change with a population of 330
million of which 242 million have health insurance, mainly from employment-based plans, and
estimates that the number of people without health insurance will increase from 30 million in
2019 to 35 million in 2029 (Federal Health Insurance Coverage for People under the age of 65:
2019 to 2029).

Figure 1: US Sources of Healthcare Coverage of 2019
Accompanying the ghastly prediction of health insurance coverage, reports from
numerous media outlets and politically motivated media, paints a contradictory picture of
success, on one hand; while, on the other, medical technical advances and desperation, led by
allegations of high medical care costs, defined in The Guardian article Millions of Americans –
as many as 25% of the population – are delaying getting medical help because of skyrocketing
costs (Sainato, 2019). Other contributing factors have been identified such as the ageing of
populations, increased public demand and expectations, personal income growth, rising prices of
physician and hospital services (e.g., labour costs), and inefficiencies in the organization and
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payment of care (Corinna Sorenson, 2013). Dr. F. Randy Vogenberg underscored the role of
consumerism and populism in the current approach to healthcare as he pointed out that both are
rooted in a labor-group movement directed against big business and machine-based politics to
champion the 'common person’, and consumerism increases the consumption of goods is
economically beneficial, and that consumers should be protected from inferior, dangerous, and
unfair pricing of goods. (Vogenberg, 2019). Both consumerism and populism are at the core of
the hospital value-based purchasing program, which emphasizes the need to provide quality
services to patients with a focus on value for money, especially in the light of cost increases.
As the healthcare system concentrated on a more customer-centric approach, the
implementation of the hospital VBP program as a strategy of medical management appeared
prudent to encourage the provision of higher quality patient care. However, as stated earlier, the
differences in medical needs vary, resulting in physicians concentrating on delivering complex
services with a desire to do so in large volumes. Higher care intensity does not necessarily result
in higher quality of care and can even be harmful (James, 2012). A study by Meyer, 2005 funded
by The Commonwealth Fund, found that top-performing hospitals are distinguished from others
in the following ways:
• they develop the right culture for quality to flourish.
• they attract and retain the right people to promote quality.
• they devise and update the right in-house processes for quality improvement; and
• they give staff the right tools to do the job (Meyer, 2005) .
It is, therefore, essential to analyse the current state of Hospital Performance against Value-based
Purchasing.
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I.3

Research question and Objectives

What factors affect hospital performance?
•
•
•
•

I.4

To examine the factors that contribute to hospital performance.
To assess whether value-based purchasing improves hospital performance.
To provide a guide to healthcare decision-makers and business associates.
To add to the body of knowledge on VBP and healthcare reform.

Motivation for study
High cost, Low quality. Compared to other developed nations, the U.S. healthcare
services only recently in the last eight years transitioned to a patient-centered
approach. As such, the introduction of the Value-based Hospital Program was a
reasonable attempt to achieve patient satisfaction. However, there are considerable
disadvantages to the program spearheaded by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid
Services.
Organizational Inefficiencies. Primary care doctors and nurses are crucial to
hospital performance and patient care. Short staffing of these personnel can lead to
devaluation of care provided. Value-based purchasing program serve acute-care
institutions that often handle large volumes of diverse patients that require specified
treatment and care. Another factor to be considered is lengthy hospital stays, or
delayed discharges which can result in putting urgent care and inbound patients at
risk. High readmission rates Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, avoidable
readmissions often occur because inpatient care quality and care coordination is poor
(Becker, 2016). Poor communication is at the root of poor patient flow, long stays
and high readmission rates. Inadequate communication between health care teams,
such as communication between physicians, nurses and other medical staff has an
impact on the bottom line (Becker, 2016).
Healthcare Access. Americans today are still without health insurance making
access to healthcare challenging. Those who have health insurance may be subjected
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to cost cutting measures imposed by insurers as not all healthcare plans meet the
needs of patients which poses a problem in accessing valuable healthcare.
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II

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of the research was to provide a comprehensive review of the literature and
industry practices in hospital performance in relation to value-based purchasing programs. In
reviewing Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) literature and its effects on hospital performance
(HP), the study included publications from over 15 years from 2008 to 2019. The relevance of
the timeline should be noted as it parallels the trajectory of the establishment of VBP program in
hospitals across the United States, through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), signed into law as part of the 2010 patient protection and affordable care act
(BLUMENTHAL, 2013). The search span across various health related keywords with strong
emphasis on the following: value-based purchasing in hospitals, incentivized performance,
patient care, patient experience, patient safety, U.S hospitals, patient outcome, clinical care,
hospital performance, nursing care, physician/doctor care and efficiency and cost.
II.1 Process of Thematic Categorization
The process of synthesis entailed selecting articles relevant to the study’s aim and
purpose and a classification exercise developed from emerging themes found throughout the
literature. The primary source of investigation was hospital value-based purchasing related
journals such as the Journal of Community Health, Journal of Hospital Medicine, and Health
Affairs in which the Georgia State University Library databases was leveraged through the use of
JSTOR, SAGE Journal, EBSCOhost, Wiley InterScience and Google Scholar. Table 1. below
provides the working definition that guided the flow of literature review.
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Table 1: Definition of Thematic Areas
Themes

Definition

Value in Healthcare

In Healthcare, value is defined as the patient health outcomes
achieved per dollar spent (Porter, What is Value in Health Care,
2010).
•
•

The Donabedian Model

Safety: the prevention of harm to patients.
Patient Experience: the sum of all interactions, shaped by an
organization’s culture that influence patient perceptions,
across the continuum of care.
• Clinical Care: The clinical consultation is when the
diagnosis is made correctly or incorrectly.
• Efficiency and Cost: cost of care associated with a specific
level of quality of care.
A conceptual model that provides a framework for examining
health services and evaluating quality of health care.

Incentive Reform

"Pay-for-performance" is an umbrella term for initiatives aimed at
improving the quality, efficiency, and overall value of health care.

Value-Based Purchasing

The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program is a Centers

Programs

for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initiative that rewards
acute-care hospitals with incentive payments for the quality care
provided to Medicare beneficiaries.

Impact of Value-based

An indication of the improvement of quality of care, e.g. FY 2019

Purchasing Programs

increase 38.1 from FY 2018 37.4.

II.2 Value in Healthcare
In any field, improving performance and accountability depends on having a shared goal
that unites the interests and activities of all stakeholders. In most fields, the preeminent goal is
value. In healthcare, the days of business as usual are over. Around the world, healthcare systems
have struggled with rising costs and uneven quality despite the hard work of well-intentioned,
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well-trained clinicians (Porter M. E., 2013). Value as the key concept in healthcare systems plays
a key role in medical practice and an increased importance of patient centeredness (Marzorati &
Pravettoni, 2017). The concept of value refers to the output achieved relative to the cost incurred
in which, value is defined as the patient health outcomes achieved per dollar spent (Porter, 2010).
Despite the overarching significance of value in health care, access to care is a basic requirement
of any healthcare system, but access per se does not constitute value and it has not been the
central focus (Porter, 2010). We must move away from a supply-driven healthcare system
organized around what physicians do and toward a patient-centered system organized around
what patients need (Marzorati & Pravettoni, 2017).
The success of traditional systems depends on the ability to decompose and recompose
elements of the system (Rouse, 2008). Consider the large number of players or "agents" involved
in the healthcare system, and recent attempts to reform healthcare have tended, in effect, to
pursue the lowest acceptable cost of health care for the American population (Rouse, 2008),
which made the reformation of healthcare a necessary component. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that each type of agent seeks to serve its interests and provide its customers with quality
products and services (Rouse, 2008), hence the justification for incentive programs as valuebased purchases. However, the failures to adopt value as the central goal in health care and to
measure value are arguably the most serious failures of the medical community (Porter, 2010).
The current delivery system was not organized around value for patients. However, it rewards
those who shift costs, bargain away, capture someone else’s revenues, and bill for more services,
not those who deliver the most value (Porter, 2009).
One of the central issues in designing a VBP program is the definition of value
(Tompkins, Higgins, & Ritter, 2009). In the healthcare market, value to the purchaser is quality
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in relation to the cost of care: value can increase by improving the quality of services in return
for the same payments made to providers or by lowering the payments made for the same quality
of care. It is therefore prudent to look at the various value-based measures of performance to
understand the impact each has on hospital performance.
II.3 The Donabedian Model
The model proposed by Avedis DONABEDIAN has been a widely accepted method to
design the main dimensions of healthcare quality, define by Structure-Process-Outcomes. (El
Haj, Lamrini, & Rais, 2013); which takes into consideration all challenges that healthcare
institutions have to face due to their poorly designed processes (El Haj, Lamrini, & Rais, 2013).
Donabedian, 2005 three components approach for evaluating the quality of care underpins
measurement for improvement. The three components are structure, process, and outcomes:

Figure 2: Donabedian Model
Donabedian believed that structure measures have an effect on process measures, which in
turn affect outcome measures (Academy, 2012). The model focuses on the measurement of
quality and highlights the follow:
Structure measures. these reflect the attributes of the service/provider such as staff to
patient ratios and operating times of the service. (access issue for patients to receive
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appropriate care - if there is a shortage in medical/administrative staff, equipment
shortage, lack of space, time, funding/financial issues).
Process measures. Reflects the way systems and processes work to deliver a desired
outcome. (If there is an issue in the process, this can affect diagnosis, treatment example
wrong medication etc., and other services such respect to patients, privacy adherence.)
Outcome measures. these reflect the impact on the patient and demonstrate the end
result of your improvement work and whether it has ultimately achieved the aim(s) set.
(This speaks to the following results: Objective measures such as blood work showing
infection – clinical care, Subjective measures such as a patient quality of life after
treatment/hospital discharge and group level such as population statistics).
The Donabedian model is a measuring tool.
Avedis Donabedian has been conscious that it is important to assess the quality of care and
services offered to “Patients” in order to improve the healthcare quality (El Haj, Lamrini, & Rais,
2013).
II.4 Reform
Healthcare in general, more specifically healthcare provided by hospitals in the United
States of America has been fraught with a myriad of complex, interrelated, entrenched, and not
easily resolved problems (Bond, 2013). Some of the problems of the American healthcare system
are knowledge asymmetry, agency problems, lack of price transparency, and biased selection of
patients (Bond, 2013). The challenges with healthcare have been given recurrent attention in
various mediums and generally recognized by the various stakeholders (Bond, 2013). In this
regard, patience, private insurers, employees, and Medicare have continued to make the call for
the establishment of further incentives. These incentives are geared towards enhancing the
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quality of care, decreasing utilization, and improving overall (Bond, 2013). This call for
incentives can be arguably well intentioned to ameliorating healthcare for all stakeholders.
At this juncture, the point must be vehemently made that while incentives can be a huge
impetus for stakeholders' positive action, it is not without challenges. Incentives have been
shown to affect response from payers, patients, and the various health care workers (Bond,
2013). Notwithstanding, the design and application of incentives to a complex and heterogeneous
healthcare system have challenges. Healthcare comprises various stakeholders, with varying
levels of power and sensibilities to incentives, thus being an effective motivating force toward a
particular behavior. To be more specific, the incentive that works for doctors might be repulsive
for the insurer. What incites the patient towards a particular behavior might be counter to
Medicare. The suite of incentives must be tailored to the various stakeholders. Even more jarring
has been achieving optimality; these differently tailored incentives have coexisted and had
complementarity in the healthcare ecosystem (Bond, 2013). A tall, challenging, and arguably
elusive ask.
The challenge to design and implement the incentives is not the only problem. An even
greater problem is that incentives might create the opposite of the desired outcome and result in a
distortion of the market (Bond, 2013). Using an analogy of candy and kids’, mom gives the kid
candy if he promises to behavior, it works beautifully in first couple of instances. However, what
happens when the kid demands more candy, something thing else in addition to candy, tires of
candy and can get candy at his friend’s house without having to behave. The previously
described scenario though simplistic illustrate the challenge with incentives and raises the issue
of sustainability. In addition, in the literature it was delineated that:
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The marginal impact of an incentive for any actor in the health care system will depend in
part on its relationship to existing salary and wealth. Thus, reason would suggest that a
$5,000 bonus payout would be far more meaningful to a nurse making $60,000 than to a
physician making $200,000 (Bond, 2013).
Intricately linked to this argument is that even though an existing incentive is to have
20% of executive pay based on performance. Any binding or definitive guidelines are absent in
terms of safe maximums or conversely effective minimums for the various workers in health care
(Bond, 2013)Another undesirable challenge with potentially deleterious impact is that incentives
would often to be synchronized. The performance at an individual level, group level, and wider
health care level has often been linked to being more explicit. This raises whether the incentive
will be paid when an individual target has been realized vis-à-vis when the tied triggers require
all targets at the various levels for any incentive to be paid (Bond, 2013). The respective impact
of the absence of an incentive linkage to individual performance can be frustrating, while the
linkage of incentives to the wider organizational performance can be demotivating (Bond, 2013).
Moreover, as previously alluded to in the metaphor with the kid and candy, demotivation is
likely to set in when incentive mechanisms call for continuous advancement. Considering that,
observations of the healthcare system's existing incentives delineate that gains in quality and cost
tend to overtime. Furthermore, it must highlight that mechanisms that focus on improvement
over time tend to be skewed towards the healthcare workers. In contrast, fluctuations in the
number may be skewed in favor of the hospital or healthcare network, which is usually in charge
of receiving and issuing incentives (Bond, 2013). Another negative impact of incentive reform is
that it raises ethical dilemmas. An incentive may become so effective that it causes selection bias
in the healthcare system. Selection bias because patients who are deemed less non-compliant or
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are less than healthy by exclusion, so that incentive-linked targets are not negatively affected.
The aforesaid quintessence is portrayed by the success of the health maintenance organization
(HMO) model. According to this model, whereby the provider takes the risk for most of the care,
most of the patients are employed persons and their families that benefit from insurance, so there
is an exclusion of highly complex and highly risky patients (Bond, 2013). Also, in the new ACO
model, which is analogous to the HMO model as it concerns shard risk and reward, strong
financial rewards may induce health workers to be complicit in selection bias.
Solutions to these problems have included projects such the Acute Care Episode (ACE)
demonstration project in which provider bonuses were capped 25 percent of physicians’
Medicare rate in order that the incentives would reward clear cost savings instead of growing or
reducing the volume of patients (Bond, 2013). Another possible solution is to exclude some team
members from the incentive system. These team members could therefore be designated as
conflict-of-interest mediators and be used at the integrated system level (Bond, 2013).
Incentives based solely on financial terms may not be effective and have limited appeal
(Flodgren et al, 2011). Seeing that financially driven incentives may eclipse intrinsic motivation,
erode the social relationship with patients and retard teamwork optimality because of envy and
competition. Non-financial incentives may have a reward and recognition facet, but lifestyle and
work flexibility have tremendous appeal. Organizational justice also has been showed to be
related to favorable performance. Therefore, incentive reform could be more positively impactful
if it incorporated both financial and non-financial elements (Bond, 2013). It must be
acknowledged that incentives in the American health care has undergone progressive reform, but
even further reform is required. Incentive reform in the American healthcare system cannot be
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seen as a destination but instead as a continuous journey in order to increase the likelihood of
widespread positive impacts among the various stakeholders.
II.5 Value-Based Purchasing Programs
There are numerous VBP pay-for-performance programs both internationally and within the
United States, encompassing a wide variety of healthcare delivery settings, and implemented by
both commercial insurance companies and by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(Chee, Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016). Originally, there are 5 original value-based programs; their goal is
to link provider performance of quality measures to provider payment:
•
•
•
•

End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (ESRD QIP)
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program
Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP)
Value Modifier (VM) Program (also called the Physician Value-Based Modifier or
PVBM)
There are other types of value-based programs that are geared towards measuring other areas in
healthcare.
Hospital Acquired Conditions (HAC) Reduction Program (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2020).Hospitals are rewarded ‘based on the quality of care provided to Medicare
patients, not just the quantity of services provided’ (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
2020).

The program:
•
•
•

Withholds participating hospitals’ Medicare payments by a percentage specified by
law (2%).
Uses the estimated total amount of those reductions to fund value-based incentive
payments to hospitals based on their performance in the program.
Applies the net result of the reduction and the incentive as a claim-by-claim adjustment
factor to the base operating Medicare severity diagnosis-related group (MS-DRG)
payment amount for Medicare fee-for-service claims in the fiscal year associated with
the performance period (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020).
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According to the 2016 study, on the state of value-based purchasing program, despite the
wide implementation of VBP programs their impact has been marginal thus far (Chee, Ryan, &
Wasfy, 2016). This sentiment was further reinforced by the 2016 review of the literature that
stated “eleven studies focused on hospitals, mainly on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services HQID program, with 6 studies having good quality and showing modestly positive
results” (Chee, Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016).
II.6 The Impact of Value-based Purchasing Programs
As previously outlined, Value-Based Purchasing are programs (public or private) that
link financial reimbursement to performance on measures of quality (i.e., structure, process,
outcomes, access, and patient experience) and cost or resource use (Damberg et al., 2014).
Healthcare has reoriented towards quality and value, incorporating health outcomes and
the resources allocated to achieve those outcomes. With healthcare consuming almost one-fifth
of the U.S. economy, the burden of healthcare expenditures continues to crowd out funds for
other society essentials such as education, infrastructure, and social security programs (Chee,
Ryan, & Wasfy, 2016). The overarching goal of this VBP by Medicare is to influence the health
service offered by the hospital care provider towards high value instead of mainly high volume.
Although the published evidence from pay-for-performance (P4P) programs implemented by
private-sector payers between 2000 and 2010 showed mostly modest results in improving
performance, 3–10 public and private payers have continued to experiment with the use of
financial incentives as a policy lever to drive improvements in care (Damberg, et al., 2014).
Damberg et al., review the effects of value-based purchasing programs by examining
three broad areas, but for the purpose of this study only two will be addressed, namely.
•

Environmental scan of existing value-based purchasing programs: publicly
available for 129 VBP programs (91 P4P programs, 27 ACOs, and 11 bundled
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payment programs) sponsored by private health plans, regional collaboratives,
Medicaid agencies or states, and the federal government.
• Review of the published evaluation literature on value-based purchasing:
examined the peer-reviewed published literature for studies that evaluated the
impact of P4P, ACO, or VBP-type bundled payment programs.
The study results indicated that there exist inconsistencies across programs and that the
goals specified by VBP program sponsors were not quantified (Damberg et al., 2014). The
absence of quantifiable goals for many programs makes it difficult to determine whether
programs have successfully met their goals (Damberg et al., 2014). Their review of the literature
showed a relatively narrow set of measures included in VBP programs that are used as the basis
for differential payments. The measures vary somewhat by the health care settings in which they
are being deployed and the type of VBP model (Damberg et al., 2014).
Another noteworthy aspect of Damberg et al. study is a popularly identified challenge is
that the metrics used by the VBP only address a facet of the provision of the health service
(Damberg et al., 2014). In addition, it has been advanced that the performance indicators aligned
to these metrics have not evolved over the decade in response to changing realities (Damberg et
al., 2014). There is also the inherent issue that there is no universal agreement on what
constitutes quality or value (Damberg et al., 2014). Closely related to the previously outlined is
that some of these metrics are not easily quantifiable. Some of the metrics are outside of the
control of the hospital. A case in point the metric of patient outcome, while there are steps that
can and should be taken by the hospital towards securing the likelihood of a positive outcome for
a patient. Those mentioned above can be distinguished from the fact that lifestyle behaviors such
as diet, exercise, and smoking significantly impact patient outcomes and even patient safety
(Damberg et al., 2014). There is also a disparity between what Medicare would describe as a
positive patient experience vis-à-vis what the patients themselves would describe as a positive.
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Nonetheless, the main thrust of the VBP influence the health service offered by the
hospital care provider towards high value instead of mainly high volume. In the last two years
steps have been taken to improve the program’s performance through streamlining various
aspects such as that of measuring the Safety domain. In addition, the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MEDPAC) has released a recommendation to Congress that would
create a new Hospital Value Incentive Program (HVIP) that would merge two programs (Brown,
2018). HVIP would aim to avoid the disparities in payment adjustments that arise from serving
different patient populations. With the proposed regulations for 2019, CMS is starting to
implement this recommendation. HVIP would have four main areas:
• Readmissions
• Mortality
• MSPB
• Overall patient experience (Brown, 2018).
Overall, while there have been efforts to streamline the program, the fact remains that ‘under
VBP, organizations have the potential for upside or downside reimbursement’ (Brown, 2018). ‘If
organizations fail to meet these thresholds for the measures, they will receive a penalty’ (Brown,
2018), which puts hospitals under pressure and may potentially hinder hospital performance.
II.7 Rationale
It is imperative to look at different aspects of hospital care, specifically; teaching
intensity, hospital size, and Case Mix Index, and how each impacted the four measures: safety,
clinical care, patient experience, and efficiency and cost. The Donabedian model of the structure,
process, and outcome shapes our logic of the quality-of-care process in this study. Hospital size
and Case Mix index fall under the model's structural component; Teaching intensity falls under
the process component, and all dependent variables (safety, clinical care, patient experience, and
efficiency and cost) fall under the outcome component of the model.
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II.8 Outcomes
Model 1 –Safety
Safety is the foundation of good patient care (Vincent, 2010). The IOM defined safety as
“the prevention of harm to patients (Mitchell, 2008). Emphasis is placed on the system of care
delivery that (1) prevents errors; (2) learns from the errors that do occur; and (3) is built on a
culture of safety that involves health care professionals, organizations, and patients (Mitchell,
2008)
Medicine has been an inherently risky enterprise; the hopes of benefit and cure are
always linked to the possibility of harm (Vincent, 2010)
Patient safety is a problem when hospital care does not yield less readmission, which
means that patients are at a higher risk. Lowering hospital readmission rates has become a
primary target for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. However, studies of the
relationship between adherence to the recommended hospital care processes and readmission
rates have inconsistent and inconclusive results (Stefan et al., 2012). Dangerous treatments were
one form of harm. However, hospitals could also be secondary sources of harm, in which
patients acquired new diseases simply from being in the hospital (Vincent, 2010).
Model 2 – Clinical Care (Mortality)
Literature often refers to the quality of care provided when referring to clinical care. The
key dimensions of quality of health care are individual patients, access, and effectiveness. The
clinical consultation speaks to the accuracy of a diagnosis, which is crucial to patient safety
(Caldwell, 2019). Modernization of the healthcare system as a result of physicians are under
pressure to see more and more patients and to fulfill management perquisites for measuring
incentive rewards (Caldwell, 2019). Healthcare providers have recognized that clinical
consultations are a crucial profitable mechanism for their business and have sought to enhance
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the clinical consultation process and prevent misdiagnosis with substantial patient satisfaction
and experience (Caldwell, 2019)
In this study Clinical Care represents the mortality rate at a given facility. In healthcare
settings, volume can improve clinical quality across a wide range of procedures and conditions
(Gaynor et al.2005, Hannan 1999, Luft et al. 1990). Clinical process scores in the study assess
whether “what is known to be ‘good’ medical care has been applied.” This process measures
whether or not a healthcare provider gives the recommended care to patients with a particular
condition (Bonfrer et al., 2018). One hypothesis is that teaching hospitals, which care for many
of the sickest and most vulnerable patients, have continued to employ appropriate readmission
policies that optimize patient survival irrespective of potential financial penalties (Shahian et al.,
2020). Also, hospitals performing higher numbers of certain surgical operations have
demonstrated significantly lower operative mortality and morbidity, presumably through
increased experience and selective referral patterns (Luft, Hunt, and Maerki 1987; Dudley et al.
2000; Birkmeyer et al. 2002). As such, it was deemed prudent to measure the impact that valuebased purchasing had on clinical care as hospitals aim to maintain the standard.
Model 3 - Patient Experience
Patient experience encompasses the range of interactions that patients have with
healthcare system, including their care from health plans, and from doctors, nurses, and staff in
hospitals, physician practices, and other health care facilities (Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality). Patient experience has been consistently and positively associated with other
quality outcomes including patient safety and clinical effectiveness across a wide range of
studies, and healthcare facilities providing high-quality clinical care tend to have better
experiences reported by patients (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014). However, Quality is a multi-
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dimensional concept, and a single indicator does not (and should not) reflect quality in other
domains (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014).
There has been an increasing acknowledgement that patient experience is now a top priority for
healthcare leaders. However, in the 2009 Health Leaders Media Patient Experience Leadership
Survey 3 discovered that when it comes to defining patient experience, there are widely
divergent views within the healthcare industry (Wolf, Niederhauser, Marshburn, & LaVela,
2014). The terms patient experience, patient perspective, patient reports, patient perception and
patient satisfaction are often used interchangeably, but patient experience, the most commonly
used (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014) for the purpose of this paper we will adopt the definition of
the Beryl Institute’s current definition for patient experience – “the sum of all interactions,
shaped by an organization’s culture that influence patient perceptions, across the continuum of
care” (Wolf, Niederhauser, Marshburn, & LaVela, 2014).
In measuring patient experience various factors must be considered for example, doctor–
patient communication could be evaluated by external raters viewing videotapes of consultations
to score the quality of the interaction, and access to primary care can be measured by using
‘mystery shopper’ approaches to measure the proportion of times a request for a particular
appointment time could be met (Ahmed, Burt, & Roland, 2014). All measurements have their
limitations, as in the case of patient experience, a multi-dimensional indicator that speaks highly
to the quality of care and services in order to determine the overall performance of the hospital.
Model 4 – Efficiency and Cost
The AQA defines efficiency of care as the cost of care associated with a specific level of quality
of care (Russo and Adler). The Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary (MSPB) Measure shows
whether Medicare spends more, less, or about the same for an episode of care (“episode”) at a
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specific hospital compared to all hospitals nationally. This measure evaluates hospitals’ costs
compared to the costs of the national median (or midpoint) hospital. This measure takes into
account important factors like patient age and health status (risk adjustment) and geographic
payment differences (payment-standardization).
Healthcare systems capable of ensuring equitable and efficient services are essentials for a
general and continuous improvement of the population’s health status (Asandului, Roman, &
Fatulescu, 2014). Our health care system is characterized by high and rising healthcare costs as
well as gaps in quality, safety, equity, and access (Fraser, Encinosa, & Glied, 2008). Most of the
current hospital performance measures do not identify the relationship between quality and cost
of care and, therefore, are not health care efficiency measures, as a result measurements of
physician efficiency do not identify the relationship between quality and cost of care (Russo and
Adler). According to the American Quality Alliance (AQA), cost of care is a measure of the total
health care spending, which includes the total use of resources and unit prices for health care
services provided to a patient or a population over time (Russo and Adler). In rewarding
hospitals for differential value — quality combined with cost — it is crucial to create definitive
characteristics, even though health value may in fact have varied agility.
II.9 Assessment of Quality of Care - Structure & Process
Teaching Intensity
Historically, teaching hospitals have been pioneers in innovation in medicine, and there is
no reason to assume that they cannot face the challenges presented by value-based purchasing
programs. However, there does exist the perception that the individual health practitioners
working in the health care system, and particularly the junior members of teams, are more likely
to undermine rather than build patient safety (Cook et al., 1998). Senior medical practitioners are
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seen as leaders and key determinants of the quality and safety of medical services (Scott, 2009).
Contemporary application of safety science and quality improvement methods is moving towards
redesigning systems by reviewing, adapting and changing healthcare processes, technology and
environments to prevent, minimize or recover errors that could lead to patient harm (Erbault et
al., 2003; Glickman et al., 2007).
This study defines “junior doctor” as a newly qualified medical practitioner who has
recently graduated from medical school (1 to 3 years postgraduate) and is employed in a clinical
post under the supervision of a senior medical specialist located at a hospital or general practice.
Junior doctors’ currency of training brings contemporary and up-to-date knowledge of standards
of “best practice” and less deviation from such standards (e.g. Choudhry et al., 2005). Junior
doctors are in an ideal position to ask questions, identify and understand deviation from optimal
practice because of their contemporary scientific knowledge. Their unique insights and
capabilities are a valuable and untapped resource (e.g. junior doctors have better contemporary
knowledge of innovative health care technologies and support tools) (Agents for Change, 2011;
Brown et al., 2012; Swanwick, 2012). Hence, the researcher hypothesizes that teaching hospital
help improve a hospital’s safety.
Clinical care in teaching hospitals is more expensive which garners more scrutiny.
Although they serve vital roles in education, research and management of complex diseases and
care of vulnerable population, debate continues as to whether teaching hospital deliver better
outcomes for common conditions (Shahian, Liu, Meyer, Torchiana, & Normand, 2014). Shahian
2014 study, aimed to determine the association between risk mortality and teaching intensity for
3 common conditions. The result of study determined that teaching hospitals had very favorable
performance in quality (Shahian, Liu, Meyer, Torchiana, & Normand, 2014). As previously
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argued teaching hospitals are better equipped financially, technologically, and academically to
provide clinical care. Hence, it was deemed by the researcher an important variable to assess the
association with teaching intensity, as incentive reward depends on clinical care outcomes.
Delivering patient-centered care is an important component of a high-quality health care
system (Tsai, Orav, & Jha, 2015). Teaching intensity is assumed to have a positive effect on
patient experience because of a variety of factors such as the initial interaction with interns,
accessibility to quality care (up to date to technology and best practices etc.) and diversification
of staff knowledge (residents).
Hospital Size
The organizational behavior literature has consistently identified size as the most
important organizational characteristic predicting innovation adoption among organizations. For
instance, Damanpour [16], following a study of 57 libraries, observed that larger facilities
adopted more technology than smaller facilities. This is because larger organizations tend to have
more financial resources that they can devote to implementing new technologies. Lacking such
resources, smaller organizations are forced to make difficult tradeoffs in their investment choices
and often forgo implementation of expensive technologies. A similar logic can be extended in
the context healthcare in that larger hospitals, by virtue of their larger resource endowments, can
adopt more health care information technology than smaller hospitals (Hikmet et. al., 2007).
Smaller hospitals often lack the technology, staffing, infrastructure, and resources
necessary to implement patient safety practices (Klingner, Moscovice, Tupper, & Coburn, 2009).
The higher the volume of hospital occupancy the more learning occurs, and the better the
performance (Theokary & Ren, 2011). Thus, hospital size plays an important role in determining
patient safety.
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Hospitals complement and amplify the effectiveness of many other parts of the health system,
providing continuous availability of services for acute and complex conditions (World Health
Organization - Hospitals, 2020). However, there is the belief that larger hospitals lead to lower
average costs and better clinical outcomes through the exploitation of economies of scale
(Giancotti, Guglielmo, & Mauro, 2017). Hospital functions vary according to health-care
delivery organizations and each hospital’s unique position in the system (World Health
Organization - Hospitals, 2020). In many countries, the hospital sector has been involved in a
massive reform process marked by financial restructuring of existing hospitals, mergers and
closures of several small hospitals (Giancotti, Guglielmo, & Mauro, 2017). Hence, they need to
maintain oversight of all ongoing health and health system reforms and ensure policies and
incentives are coherent and aligned (World Health Organization - Hospitals, 2020). In addition,
the logic behind hospital size and customer fulfillment is that larger hospital due to the
availability of more resources have the structural and organizational processes in place to
contribute to exceptional patient experience. For instance, technology adoption facilitates care
models that improves patient experience. Hospitals and clinics nationwide are adding
newfangled technologies rarely seen before in healthcare settings, building them right into their
facilities. In doing so, they are enabling the change from provider-centered to patient-centered
care, giving patients not only a better experience but better outcomes, too (Arndt, 2017).
Case Mix Index
In an effort to refine the present Medicare reimbursement methodology and to reduce
health care costs, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) of the federal government's
Department of Health and Human Services has developed a reimbursement ceiling that includes
an adjustment factor for hospital case mix. "Case mix is a way of defining a hospital's 'product'
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or output by identifying clinically homogeneous groups of patients that utilize similar bundles' of
treatments, tests, and services. Case mix is a practice of coding that is administratively useful for
partitioning patient services and determining resource allocation." The reason for using a case
factor is to link the medical complexity of a hospital's Medicare case mix and its resultant
demand hospital resources to the level of Medicare reimbursement (Doremus and Michenzi,
1983). Overall, a higher CMI indicates that a hospital treats a more complex set of patients.
Insurers such as Medicare use DRGs (Diagnosis Related Group) to reimburse hospitals and
higher DRGs correspond to higher reimbursement rate (Ganju, Gupta, & Matreja, 2016)
The logic dictates that a hospital performing more complex cases should receive a higher
reimbursement rate than a hospital doing fewer complex cases. This is the reason CFOs and
other financial employees at hospitals work hard to drive up their hospital’s CMI. As such, it is
important to document exactly what happens in each case accurately. One critical component of
documentation in a hospital’s surgical areas is the detail surrounding medical devices used in
each case. If medical devices used in procedures are undocumented, this can result in inaccurate
reporting of CMI and adversely impact reimbursement rate down the line (Why Case Mix Index
Matters To Your Hospital And How To Maximize It, 2017). Hospitals executing more difficult
procedures tend to be larger in nature. A debate can be that case mix index positively impacts
patient safety as per the previous statement regarding procedure execution. Larger hospitals more
resources- and so their survival rate will be higher.
In Deloitte's 2016 report the value of patient experience: Hospitals with better patientreported experience perform better financially, we found that higher patient experience scores
are associated with higher hospital profitability and that this association is strongest for aspects
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of patient experience most likely to be associated with better clinical care (in particular, nurse
staffing engagement), (Betts & Balan-Cohen, 2016).
II.10 Hypotheses
Model 1 – Safety
H1- Teaching intensity influences Safety
H2- Hospital Size influences Safety
H3- Case Mix Index Influences Safety
Model 2 – Clinical Care
H4- Teaching Intensity influences Clinical Care
H5- Hospital Size influences Clinical Care
H6- Case Mix Index influences Clinical Care
Model 3 – Patient Experience
H7- Teaching Intensity influences Patient Experience
H8- Hospital Size influences Patient Experience
H9- Case Mix Index Influences Patient Experience
Model 4 – Efficiency and Cost
H10- Teaching Intensity influences Efficiency and Cost
H11- hospital size influences Efficiency and Cost
H12- Case Mix Index Influences Efficiency and Cost
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III CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
III.1 Research Design
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is the U.S. federal agency that
works with state governments to manage the Medicare program, and administer Medicaid and
the Children’s Health Insurance program. CMS offers many great resources for researchers who
are looking for health data. For example:
•

CMS Statistics is a yearly reference booklet that people can download on the CMS website.
It has summary information about health care expenses and use.
• The Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement has detailed statistics on Medicare,
Medicaid, and other CMS programs. It has 115 tables and 67 charts that detail health
expenditures for the entire U.S. population.
• Hospital Compare is an online tool created by CMS that helps users find information about
the quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-certified hospitals across the United States.
• The CMS Data Navigator lets users search across all CMS programs using a menu-driven
search application. Users can specify a particular type of data, or search for all available data
types (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2020).
CMS requires Medicare managed care program providers to retain records for 10 years. This
requirement is available at 42 CFR 422.504 on the Internet. Providers/suppliers should maintain
a medical record for each Medicare beneficiary that is their patient. Remember that medical
records must be accurately written, promptly completed, accessible, properly filed and retained.
Using a system of author identification and record maintenance that ensures the integrity of the
authentication and protects the security of all record entries is a good practice (Medical Record
Retention and Media Formats for Medical Records , 2012). To address the research question:
“What factors affect hospital performance? The study explores the data behind CMS ratings to
examine the significance of VPB. The research design summary is explained in Table 2.
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Table 2: Research design Summary (adapted from Mathiassen, 2017)
Component

Definition

Specification

Title

The title expresses the essence of the
research design, with emphasis on C

An Exploratory Study of The Factors
Affecting Hospital Performance: Safety,
Clinical Care, Patient Experience, Efficiency
and Cost

P

The problem setting represents
people’s concerns in a real-world
problematic situation.

The quality of healthcare has declined while
cost have risen.

A

The area of concern represents
somebody of knowledge in the
literature that relates to P.

Healthcare reform and the outcomes,
structure, and process of Medicare’s value
base purchasing program

The conceptual framing helps
structure collection and analyses of
data from P to answer RQ; FA draws
on concepts from A, whereas FI
draws on concepts independent of A.

Donabedian model of quality and care

The method details the approach to
empirical inquiry, specifically to data
collection and analysis.

Exploration of Secondary data from CMS

The research question relates to P,
opens for research into A, and helps
ensure the research design is coherent
and consistent.

What factors affect hospital performance?

Contributions influence P and A, and
possibly also F and M.

Prescriptive guide for policy makers, hospital
administrators, medical, business
professionals and researchers.
Add to the body of knowledge in healthcare
reform and VBP.

F

M

RQ

C

III.2 Dependent variables
Safety (Healthcare Associated Infections). To be incentivized by Center of Medicare
and Medicaid Services, all hospitals participating in the Value based Purchasing program
have to report all data surrounding patients with infections to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). This
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measure provides essential data to display the number of times a patient from a particular
hospital contracts an infection during the course of their medical treatment when
compared to like hospitals. “The safety domain is comprised of six healthcare associated
infections (HAI) measures and one perinatal care measure that are weighted together at a
twenty percent of the total performance score.
Clinical Care (Mortality). This measure are estimates of deaths within a 30-day period
of hospital admissions in regard to medical conditions such as, heart attack (AMI), heart
failure (HF), pneumonia (PN), Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), stroke,
and surgical procedures such as coronary artery bypass graft (CABG). A 30-day window
is used for this measure compared to the number of inpatient deaths to allow for a more
reliable measure as hospital stays may vary across patients and hospital. “The clinical
care domain comprises of three mortality measures and one surgical complication
measure that are weighted together at twenty five percent of the total performance score.
Patient Experience (Person and community engagement). This means of data
collection methodology is used to measure patients’ perception of their hospital
experience. To aid with the measure data is collected from providing to patients the
HCAHPS patient survey also called the CAHPA hospital survey or Hospital CAHPS.
The survey is given to random patients upon discharge. The survey asks key questions in
regard to communication with hospital staff, responsiveness of hospital staff, cleanliness
of hospital environment and quietness of hospital environment and transition of care.
“The patient experience domain is comprised of eight dimensions of hospital consumer
assessment of healthcare providers and systems (HCAHPS) patient experience survey
that are weighted together at twenty of the total performance score.”
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Efficiency & Cost. Efficiency and cost reduction domain comprise of one Medicare
spending measure (Medicare spending per Beneficiary-MSPB) that is weighted at twenty
five percent of the total performance score.

Figure 3: Understanding the Value Based Purchasing Measures
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Table 3: Measures

III.3 Independent Variables
Teaching Intensity. looked at the role junior doctors played in administering health care
to patients. The study assessed the ratio between the number of interns/residents to the
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number of beds in a hospital, as Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
identifies teaching hospitals by an intern-to-bed ratio greater than 0.
Hospital Size. is based on the number of beds; specifically, hospitals were classified as
small (less than 100 beds), medium (100–399 beds) or large (400+beds) (Gabriel et. Al).
The hospital size is measured using the number of beds at the hospital (Sharma et al.,
2015).
Case Mix Index. derived from the CMS impact file to measure the severity of illness of
patients admitted to hospitals. Case mix index generally can be defined as the number
and types of patients treated, classified by diagnoses. Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)
present a patient classification scheme that belongs to case mix measures originally
developed in the United States in the 1970s. They are currently designed on the basis of
principle diagnosis, secondary diagnosis, surgical or medical procedure, age, sex and
discharge status of the patient treated (Hensen, Fürstenberg, Luger, & Steinhoff, 2005)
Control Variable
The researcher used geography and proprietary rights as control invariants at the hospital
level, including location, ownership, and region. The regions included: Northeast, West, South,
and Midwest. Hospital ownership types exist on a continuum that is more complex than simple
private or public distinction. Hospital ownership ranges from public (government owned), to
quasi-public (nonprofit), to private (for-profit hospitals) (Ibrahim, Jeffcott, & Davis, 2013).
Healthcare is one of the few industries where public and private institutions compete with one
another (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). For-profit (purely private) hospital ownership is usually
defined as being owned by stockholders with profitability as the driving force with less political
oversight than nonprofit and government hospitals. Conversely, government (purely public)
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hospitals are regulated by a governmental body, driven by survival, and overseen by political
regulations (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). Nonprofit (quasi-public) hospital ownership is defined
as private hospitals that choose to follow governmental regulations by choice rather than
requirement (Goldstein and Noar, 2005). There are practical differences in behavior between the
two hospital types. Nonprofit hospitals are less concerned about market value information and
place less emphasis on costs of healthcare inputs and odds of hospital bill payment by patients
(Goldstein and Noar, 2005). Despite these practical differences, there has been growing concern
that the level of community benefit that nonprofit hospitals provide justifies their tax exemptions
are few differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals (Young et al., 2013). Nonprofit
hospitals and private for-profit hospitals tend to have more autonomy in decision making than
their government and nonprofit counterparts because the latter are dictated by strict government
rules and regulations (Johansen and Zhu, 2013). However, some private hospitals self-select to
follow all governmental regulations to ensure they have the safest environment possible
(Goldstein and Noar, 2005).
III.4 Data Collection, Cleaning and Preparation
To test my hypotheses, we collected secondary data from 2, 786 U. S acute care hospitals
who provide inpatient services to Medicare patients. Exclusively, secondary data was retrieved
from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Hospital Compare Database and Provider
of Services (POS) and impact files. The files included 2018 Hospital Value Based Purchasing
(HVBP)- Total performance scores; and 2018 Final rule and correction notice data file.
After lots of trial and error and assessing of variables, I decided to use the most recent data
which is 2018. Additionally, 2018 was a good starting point for us, as the Center for Medicare
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and Medicaid services improved their data collection delivery parameters, making data more
succinct and user friendly. It was only logical to proceed with analyzing this available data.
All data generated had at least two common identifiers, which were the provider
identification number and measure identification or measure name. This made it very
unassuming to eyeball the data and pinpoint certain characteristics based on location. From the
2018 Hospital value base purchasing total performance score file, I elected to use the weighed
scores for safety, clinical care, person and community engagement (patient experience) and
efficiency and cost. From the 2018 Final rule and correction notice data file, I elected, the
resident to bed ratio variable, CMIV35 (Case mix index, software version 35, most up to date
software), bed variable, location, ownership and region variables. Vlookup on this data to select
only hospitals who participate in the Medicare value-based purchasing program.
For categorical variables, Region, location, and hospital ownership dummy variables
(Tables 4-Table 6) were created. From the FY 2018 IPPS Impact file region was coded as
follows: 1= New England; 2= Middle Atlantic; 3= South Atlantic; 4= East North; 5= East South
Central; 6= West North Central; 7= West South Central; 8= Mountain; 9= Pacific; 40= Puerto
Rico. I performed an IF function in excel and a grouping exercise to align the data provided for
Region with the US Census Regions and Divisions map, please see Figure (4) below. To
validate my data, I created filters in excel for all variables to make sure all data was group
correctly.
All variables were separated into their own files. All files were imported and saved in
SPSS format. These data files were then merged for analysis in SPSS. In this study we apply
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis to explore the factors that affect hospital
performance.
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Figure 4: Census Regions and Divisions of the U.S.
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Schemers
Table 4: Dummy Variables
REGION
D- Region 1
NE

D- Region 2
South

D- Region 3
Midwest

D-Region 4
West

Puerto Rico
Northeast
South
Midwest
West

0
1
0
0
0

0
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
1

Base
Case

Table 5: Dummy Variables
LOCATION
D-Urban
0
0

Urban
Rural

D-Rural
0
1

Base Case

Table 6: Dummy Variables
HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP

Government
Private
Nonprofit

D-HO 1
0
1
0

D-HO 2
0
0
1

Base Case
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III.5 Research Models

H1 - Teaching
Intensity

H2 - Hospital
Size

Safety

H3 - Case
Mix
Index

Figure 5: Model 1

H4 Teaching
Intensity

H5 Hospital
Size

H6 - Case
Mix
Index

Figure 6: Model 2

Clinical
Care
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H7 Teaching
Intensity
H8 –
Hospital
Size

Patient
Experience

H9 - Case
Mix
Index
Figure 7: Model 3

H10 Teaching
Intensity

H11 Hospital Size

H12 - Case
Mix
Index

Figure 8: Model 4

Efficiency
&
Cost
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IV CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The goal of this study was to investigate the historical context of Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing. The study hypothesized that hospital safety, clinical care, patient experience, and
efficiency and cost (dependent variables) are individually influenced by several stand-alone
factors (independent variables), as well as these same factors combined. These factors include,
teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix index. The following sections provided descriptive
statistics for all variables, bivariate regression results demonstrating the predictive nature of each
independent variable for each dependent variable, and multiple linear regression and multiple
hierarchical regression results, demonstrating the combined predictive nature of each
independent variable for each dependent variable. Region, location, and hospital ownership were
assessed for their relationship to dependent variables (bivariate regression). This was done by
regressing each dependent variable on Region, location, and hospital ownership combined.
Significant results are reported at p ≤ 0.05. For the bivariate regressions, false-discovery
rate (FDR) was applied to account for multiple comparisons of the dependent variable across
several bivariate regressions. Correction was applied for bivariate regression results for
dependent variables and control variables, with a separate correction applied to the bivariate
regression results for dependent variables and independent variables. FDR-corrections are
designed to control the proportion of "discoveries" (rejected null hypotheses) that are false (Type
I error) (Benjamin & Hochberg, 1995) Each multiple linear regression model was treated as an
independent model; therefore, no FDR correction was applied.
IV.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 4 exhibits and summarizes descriptive statistics on the dependent variables used in
this study. The dataset for all dependent variables except clinical care are slightly skewed to the
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right, being that the arithmetic mean of all these three datasets are greater than the median.
Dependent variable, clinical care, has an approximate symmetric distribution since the measures
of central tendency (mean and median) are relatively close.

Portrayed in Table 5, The datasets for all independent variables except case mix index are
positively skewed (right tail, is longer and flatter). The data for independent variable, case mix
index, has an approximate symmetric distribution since it is measure of central tendency are
comparatively close. Please see histograms in figures 9-15 as a guide for the distributions.

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous DVs (DV1, DV2, DV3, and DV4)
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous IVs (IV1, IV2 and IV3)

Figure 9: Histogram - Safety
DV1: Safety
The Safety domain is the dependent variable which comprises of two measure scores
(Healthcare associated infections and PC-01/ Percent of mothers whose deliveries were
scheduled too early (1-2 weeks early), when a scheduled delivery was not medically necessary),
(Safety domain scores, 2020). The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,572
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were valid in this study. The average value of safety scores reported to the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid services were 11.065 with a standard deviation of 5.625 (M= 11.065, SD= 5.625);
minimum .000, maximum 3.333. The skewness calculated was 0.574 meaning that our data is
moderately skewed to the right since our distribution is between 0.5 and 1. This construct is
positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 0.419 and close to zero, so, therefore, this is a normal
distribution. Alternatively, the kurtosis was divided by its standard error (0.419/0.097) = 4.319;
since the result is greater than 1.96 this also proves that the distribution is indeed a normal
distribution.

Figure 10: Histogram – Clinical Care

DV2: Clinical Care
The Clinical Care domain is the dependent variable which comprises of four mortality
measures (domain measures assess estimates of deaths in the 30 days after entering the hospital
for a specific condition (reported as the “survival” rate; therefore, higher percentage rates are
favorable), (Clinical Outcomes domain, 2020).The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of
which 2,709 were valid in this study. The average value of clinical care scores reported to the
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Center for Medicare and Medicaid services were 13.850 with a standard deviation of 5.00 (M=
13.850, SD= 5.00); minimum .000, maximum 3.33. The skewness calculated was -0.038
meaning that our data is highly skewed to the left since our distribution is less than -1. The
kurtosis statistic for clinical care is 0.06 (mesokurtic), therefore, this is a normal distribution is
close to zero. Alternatively, the skew and kurtosis statistics for this construct are not greater than
twice their standard error. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 10.

Figure 11: Histogram – Patient Experience

DV3: Patient Experience
The Patient Experience domain is the dependent variable which comprises of eight
measure scores (standardize survey that ask patients about their experiences during recent
hospital stay) (Person and community engagement domain, 2020).
The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,776 were valid in this study. The
average value of patient experience scores reported to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
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services were 9.11 with a standard deviation of 5.06 (M= 9.11, SD= 5.06); minimum .00,
maximum 3.33. The skewness calculated was 1.51 meaning that our data is highly skewed to the
right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed)
2.93 and has a normal distribution. This was determined by dividing the kurtosis by its standard
error (2.93/0.09) = 32.56; A normal distribution is present since the kurtosis is less than 3. Data
distribution is depicted in Figure 11.

Figure 12: Histogram – Efficiency and Cost
DV4: Efficiency and Cost
The efficiency and cost domain is the dependent variable whose measure is based on an
assessment of payment for services provided to a beneficiary during a spend- per-beneficiary
episode (Efficiency and cost reduction domain, 2020).
The sample size for this domain was N= 2,786 of which 2,785 were valid in this study. The
average value of efficiency and cost scores reported to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
services were 5.35 with a standard deviation of 7.12 (M= 5.35, SD= 7.12); minimum .00,
maximum 3.33.
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The skewness calculated was 1.76 meaning that our data is highly skewed to the right
since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 3.08
and has somewhat of a flat normal distribution. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 12.

Figure 13: Histogram – Teaching Intensity

IV1: Teaching Intensity
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which 2,785 were
valid in this study. The average value of teaching intensity scores reported to the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid services were 0.01 with a standard deviation of 0.08 (M= 0.01, SD=
0.08); minimum .00, maximum 1.30. The skewness calculated was 9.40 meaning that our data is
highly skewed to the right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively
kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 106.27 which is high and significant. Alternatively, the kurtosis was
divided by its standard error (106.27/.09) = 1,180.78. There is a statistically significant amount
of skew associated with this distribution because the Z value is greater than the absolute value of
1.96. In conclusion the distribution is not normal. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 13.
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Figure 14: Histogram – Hospital Size
IV2: Hospital Size
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which all cases were
valid in this study. The average value of the number of beds reported to the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid services was 269 with a standard deviation of 241.66 (M= 269, SD= 241.66);
minimum 10, maximum 2,449. The skewness calculated was 2.65 meaning that our data is
positively skewed to the right since our distribution is greater than 1. This construct is positively
kurtosed (leptokurtosed) 12.01, which is high and significant. With a kurtosis on more than 3 it
can conclude that our dataset tails are heavier than that of a normal distribution.
Alternatively, the kurtosis was divided by its standard error (12.01/.09) = 133.44. There
is a statistically significant amount of skew associated with this distribution because the Z value
is greater than the absolute value of 1.96. Therefore, it can be concluded that this distribution is
not normal. Data distribution is depicted in Figure 14.
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Figure 15: Histogram – Case Mix Index
IV3: Case Mix Index
The sample size for the teaching intensity construct was N= 2,786 of which 2,779 were
valid in this study. The average value of case mix index scores reported to the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid services were 1.61 with a standard deviation of 0.29 (M= 1.61, SD=
0.29); minimum 0.89, maximum 3.53. The skewness calculated was 0.75 moderately skewed to
the right since our distribution is between 0.5 and 1. This construct is positively kurtosed
(leptokurtosed) 2.07. Since the kurtosis is less than 3, in conclusion this distribution is normal.
Data distribution is depicted in Figure 15.

Bivariate Analyses
Below, figure 16, 17, 18, and 19 shows the models that discuss the relationship between
variables assessed with Bivariate analyses and Tables 9-12 exhibits the results of this study.
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Figure 16: Bivariate Model DV1 & DV2
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Figure 17: Bivariate Model DV3 & DV4

Table 9- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV1 and IV1-IV3
Simple
Independent
Regression #
Variable
R2 (%)
PVAL
1
Teaching
Intensity
0.40
0.001
2
Hospital Size
8.7
0.000
3
Case Mix Index
9.3
0.000

Table 10- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV2 and IV1-IV3
Simple
Independent
Regression #
Variable
R2 (%)
PVAL
1
Teaching
Intensity
0.20
0.020
2
Hospital Size
3.20
0.000
3
Case Mix Index
5.40
0.000

β

F

-.063
-.295
-.304

10.239
244.724
261.836

β

F

0.045
0.179
0.232

5.430
89.197
153.169
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Table 11- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV3 and IV1-IV3
Simple
Regression #
1
2
3

Independent
Variable
Teaching
Intensity
Hospital Size
Case Mix Index

R2 (%)

PVAL

β

F

3.00
8.60
2.30

0.006
0.000
0.000

-0.520
-0.294
-0.152

7.619
262.033
65.521

Table 12- Bivariate Simple Regression with DV4 and IV1-IV3
Simple
Regression #
1
2
3

Independent
Variable
Teaching
Intensity
Hospital Size
Case Mix Index

R2 (%)

PVAL

β

F

8.10
6.40

0.416
0.000
0.000

-0.015
-0.284
-0.253

0.661
245.024
189.641

Table 13 All hypothesized relations at Alpha 5%

HYPOTHESIS SUPPORT (*p ≤ .05)
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Effect of Teaching Intensity on Safety
H1 suggest that there is a negative correlation between teaching intensity and safety (β= .063, P=.001, F =10.239). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The
amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by teaching intensity is
.4% (R2 = 0.004) (Table 9)
Effect of Hospital Size on Safety
H2 suggest that there is a strong negative correlation between hospital size and safety (β=
-.295, P=.000, F =244.724). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The
amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by hospital size is 8.7 %
(R2 = 0.087) (Table 9).
Effect of Case Mix Index on Safety
H3 suggest that there is a statistically strong negative correlation between case mix index
and safety (β= -.304, P=.000, F =261.836). Simple regression analysis was used to test this
hypothesis. The amount of variance in safety scores that are accounted for or explained by the
case mix index is 9.3% (R2 = 0.093) (Table 9).
Effect of Teaching Intensity on Clinical Care
H4 suggest that a positive correlation exist between teaching intensity and clinical care
(β= .045, P=.020, F = 5.430). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. The
amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by teaching
intensity is .2% (R2 = .002) (Table 10).
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Effect of Hospital Size on Clinical Care
H5 suggest that a statistically notable correlation exist between hospital size and clinical
care (β= .179, P=.000, F = 89.197). Simple regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis.
The amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by hospital
size is 3.2% (R2 = .032) (Table 10).
Effect of Case Mix Index on Clinical Care
H6 suggest that a statistically essential correlation exist between case mix index and
clinical care (β= .232, P=.000, F = 153.169). Simple regression analysis was used to test this
hypothesis. The amount of variance in clinical care scores that are accounted for or explained by
case mix index is 5.4 % (R2 = .054) (Table 10).

Effect of Teaching Intensity on Patient Experience
H7 suggest that a statistically negative correlation exist between teaching intensity and
patient experience (β= -.52, P=.006, F = 7.619). Simple regression analysis was used to test this
hypothesis. The amount of variance in patient experience scores that are accounted for or
explained by teaching intensity is 3 % (R2 = .003) (Table 11).
Effect of Hospital Size on Patient Experience
H8 suggest that a strong negative correlation exist between hospital size and patient
experience (β= -.294, P=.000, F = 262.033). Simple regression analysis was used to test this
hypothesis. The amount of variance in patient experience sores that are accounted for or
explained by hospital size is 8.6 % (R2 = .086) (Table 11).
Effect of Case Mix Index on Patient Experience
H9 suggest that a statistically negative correlation exist between case mix index and
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patient experience (β= -.152, P=.000, F = 65.521). Simple regression analysis was used to test
this hypothesis. The amount of variance in patient experience sores that are accounted for or
explained by case mix index is 2.3 % (R2 = .023) (Table 11).
Effect of Teaching Intensity on Efficiency and Cost
H10 suggest that a robust negative correlation exist between teaching intensity and
efficiency and cost (β= -.015, P=.416, F = .661). Simple regression analysis was used to test this
hypothesis. The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or
explained by teaching intensity is 0 % (R2 = .000) (Table 12).
Effect of Hospital Size on Efficiency and Cost
H11 suggest that a significant negative correlation exist between hospital size and
efficiency and cost (β= -.284, P=.000, F = 245.024). Simple regression analysis was used to test
this hypothesis. The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or
explained by hospital size is 8.1% (R2 = .081) (Table 12).
Effect of Case Mix Index on Efficiency and Cost
H12 suggest that a significant negative correlation exist between case mix index and
efficiency and cost (β= -.253, P=.000, F = 189.641). Simple regression analysis was used to test
this hypothesis. The amount of variance in efficiency and cost scores that are accounted for or
explained by case mix index is 6.4% (R2 = .064) (Table 12).
Bivariate Results
Bivariate regression results indicate that teaching intensity, hospital size and CMI are
significant predictors of safety, clinical care, patient experience and efficiency and cost. More
intense teaching, larger hospitals and higher CMI all negatively predict lower safety scores. The
same is true for patient experience. Conversely, an increase on these variables predicts a higher
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level of clinical care. Efficiency and cost results present a mixed narrative, with teaching
intensity not associated with efficiency and cost, and larger hospitals and higher case index
predicting lower efficiency and cost.
IV.2 Multivariate Analyses

Figure 18: Multivariate model, all IVS on DV1 & all IVS on DV2
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Figure 19: Multivariate model, all IVS on DV3 & all IVS on DV4
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Figure 20: Hierarchical Multiple Regression, Safety and Clinical Care
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Figure 21: Hierarchical Multiple Regression, Patient experience and Efficiency and Cost

Diagnostic, Multiple Regression Model
Illustrated in Table 15 is the multicollinearity among independent variables and
dependent variables. The variance inflation factor assessed whether variables have a strong linear
relationship. If VIF > 2.5, then it indicates strong collinearity among variables. This diagnostic
was run to ensure that there was not a high degree of multicollinearity in the regressions. A high
degree of multicollinearity causes and unstable regression and also inflates the standard error.
The variables used in this study all exhibits a VIF below 2.5. There are no interrelating
characteristics among variables. As part of the assumptions testing for a multiple linear
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regression, the dataset was used to test for multicollinearity. The data included 2,786 US acute
care scores submitted to Medicare. The proposed multiple line regression would test hypotheses.

Table 14: Multicollinearity on IVs and DVs

Variable

Teaching
Intensity (VIF)

Hospital Size
(VIF)

Case Mix Index
(VIF)

Safety

1.038

1.396

1.418

Clinical Care

1.034

1.436

1.448

Patient Experience

1.037

1.400

1.417

Efficiency & Cost

0.097

1.401

1.418

VIF > 2.5
The tolerance statistic among variables (VIF = 1.038 for safety and teaching intensity;
1.40 for Patient experience and hospital size; 1.448 for Clinical care and case mix and 0.097 for
Efficiency and Cost and Teaching intensity) signifies that a very low level of multicollinearity
was present, all results generated below the VIF threshold of 2.5 therefore no collinearity was
found between variables and as a result no variables will be removed from our model.

Multivariate Results
Multiple linear regression results between dependent variables (Safety, Clinical Care,
Patient Experience and Efficiency and Cost) and independent variables (Teaching Intensity,
Hospital Size and Case Mix Index). Model fit is indicated under the r2 column. Coefficients for
each independent variable are list per model.
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Table 15: Multiple Linear Regression on DVs and IVs

Dependable
Variable

R2

Teaching Intensity
(β)

Hospital Size (β)

Case Mix Index
(β)

Safety
0.118

0.001*

-0.187*

-0.206*

0.057

0.001*

0.074*

0.191*

0.086

-0.011*

-0.295*

0.007*

0.097

0.042*

-0.213*

-0.147*

Clinical Care

Patient Experience

Efficiency & Cost

*significant at p ≤ 0.05
For Safety scores, only hospital size and CMI remain significant when all independent
variables are included in the same model. An increase in hospital size predicts a decrease in
safety scores. For Clinical care, teaching intensity is also a non-significant predictor. Meanwhile,
larger hospitals and higher CMI both predict a higher level of clinical care. For patient
experience, teaching intensity is also non-significant and so is CMI. Only hospital size is
predictive of patient experience, with larger hospitals indicating a lower score on patient
experience. Efficiency and cost are the only multivariate model in which all predictors are
significant. A higher level of teaching intensity is predictive of a higher level of efficiency and
cost. Conversely, a larger hospital and higher CMI are predictive of lower efficiency and cost
(Please see Appendix 3)

61

Table 16: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Safety

* statistically significant at 5% level
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Table 17: Hierarchical Regression DV 1 (Safety)
Model 0

Model 1

(Constant)

12.58

19.711

Region
DRegion1NE
DRegion2S
DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

-0.15
0.113
0.344
0.773

-0.38
0.149
0.171
1.199

Location
Rural 1/Urban 0

-2.158

-0.733

Ownership
DPrivate
DNonProfit

0.442
-0.147

0.144
0.057

Teaching Intensity
Case Mix Index
Hospital Size
R2
∆R2
F
∆F

0.051
-4.339
-0.004
0.033
12.413
-

0.129
0.096
37.439
25.026

Where:
∆F =

(R22 - R21 ) / (k2 - k1 )
___________________
(1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1)

F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values)
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R21 is the value of R2 for the first (smaller) model, R22 is the value of R2 for the second (larger)
model, k1 is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2 is the number of
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37).

Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Safety
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural)
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed considerably to the
regression model, F (7, 2529) = 12.413, * p = .000) and accounted for 3.3% of the variation in
Safety (Appendix MHR Table 1-2). Introducing the independent variables in model 1 (Teaching
intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 12.9% of variation in Safety
and this change in R2 was significant F (10,2526) = 37.44, *p = .000.
The statistically significant variables were Region- West, Location, Case Mix Index and
Hospital size. With case mix index generating the most intense beta value (β = –.210, B = -4.339,
*p = .000). Hospital size exhibited the second strongest beta (β =-.167, B = -.004, *p = .000);
Location results (β = -.057, B = -733, * p = .005); Region (West) results (β = .055, B = 1.199, * p
= .014).
The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of
safety were Teaching intensity (β = .001, B = .051, p = .969); Hospital ownership- DNonProfit
(β = .005, B = .057, p = .856); Hospital Ownership- DPrivate (β = .010, B = .144, p = .702);
Midwest Region- DRegion3MW results (β = .013, B = .171, p = .640); South RegionDRegion2S (β = .011, B = .149, p = .696) and North East Region- DRegion1NE (β = -.032, B = .380, p = .271), (From appendix MHR- Table 6).
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Table 18: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Clinical Care
Variable

β

DRegion1NE

β = -.017

DRegion2S
DRegion3MW

β = -.136*
β = -.027

DRegion4W

β = -.043*

Location

β = .093*

DPrivate

β = .117*

DNonProfit

β = .135*

Teaching Intensity

β = 007

Case Mix Index

β = .134*

HospitalSize

β = .075*

Final Model (1)
R2 = 9.6%

* statistically significant at 5% level
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Table 19: Hierarchical Regression DV 2 (Clinical Care)

Model 0

Model 1

(Constant)

13.708

9.337

Region
DRegion1NE
DRegion2S
DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

-0.367
-1.765
-0.44
-0.653

-0.175
-1.634
-0.31
-0.851

Location
Rural 1/Urban 0

-1.784

-1.036

1.399
1.568

1.468
1.418

Ownership
DPrivate
DNonProfit
Teaching
Intensity
Case Mix Index
HospitalSize

0.481
2.311
0.002

R2

0.066

0.096

-

0.03

26.828

28.137

-

1.309

∆R

2

F
∆F

Where:
∆F =

(R22 - R21 ) / (k2 - k1 )
___________________
(1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1)

F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values)
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R21 is the value of R2 for the first (smaller) model, R22 is the value of R2 for the second (larger)
model, k1 is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2 is the number of
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37).

Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Clinical Care

All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural)
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the
regression model, F (7, 2660) = 26.83, * p = .000) and accounted for 6.6% of the variation in
Clinical Care (appendix MHR- Table 7). Introducing the independent variables in model 1
(Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional 9.6% of variation
in Clinical Care and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2657) = 28.14, *p = .000.
The statistically significant variables were Region- South, Region- West, Location,
Hospital ownership (DPrivate, DNonProfit); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With RegionSouth generating the most intense beta value (β = –.136, B = -1.634, *p = .000). Region- West
exhibited the second strongest beta (β = -.043, B = -.851, *p = .055); Location results (β = .93, B
= 1.036, * p = .000); Hospital Ownership (DPrivate) results (β = .117, B = 1.468, * p = .000);
Hospital Ownership (DNonProfit) results (β = .135, B = 1.418, * p = .000); Case Mix Index
results (β = .134, B = 2.311, * p = .000); Hospital Size (β = .075, B = .002, * p = .001).

The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of
Clinical Care were Region- North East (β = -.017, B = .175, p = .582); Region- Midwest (β = -
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.027, B = -.310, p = .354); Teaching Intensity (β = .007, B = .481, p = .707 (appendix MHRTable 12).

Table 20: Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Patient Experience
Variable

β

DRegion1NE

β = -.017

DRegion2S

β = -.136*

DRegion3MW

β = -.027

DRegion4W

β = -.043*

Location

β = .093*

DPrivate

β = .117*

DNonProfit

β = .135*

Teaching Intensity

β = 007

Case Mix Index

β = .134*

HospitalSize

β = .075*

Final Model (1)
R2 = 9.6%

* statistically significant at 5% level
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Table 21: Hierarchical Regression DV 3 (Patient Experience)

Model 0

(Constant)

Model 1

7.34

6.69

Region
DRegion1NE
DRegion2S
DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

0.771
3.186
2.27
0.711

-1.33
3.707
2.631
0641

Location
Rural 1/Urban
0

1.626

0.988

-1.035
-0.086

-1.455
-0.086

Ownership
DPrivate
DNonProfit
Teaching
Intensity
Case Mix
Index
HospitalSize
R2
∆R

2

F
∆F

1.192
1.45
-0.007
0.088

0.166

-

0.078

37.768

54.187

-

16.419

Where:
∆F =

(R22 - R21 ) / (k2 - k1 )
___________________
(1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1)

F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values)
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R21 is the value of R2 for the first (smaller) model, R22 is the value of R2 for the second (larger)
model, k1 is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2 is the number of
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37).

Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Patient Experience
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural)
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the
regression model, F (7, 2723) = 37.77, * p = .000) and accounted for 8.8% of the variation in
Patient Experience (appendix MHR- Table 13, Table 14). Introducing the independent variables
in model 1 (Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional
16.6% of variation in Patient Experience and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2720) =
54.19, *p = .000.
The statistically significant variables were Region- North East, South, Midwest,
Location, Hospital ownership (DPrivate); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With hospital size
generating the most intense beta value (β = –.326, B = -.007, *p = .000). Hospital ownership
(DPrivate) with the second strongest beta (β = -.115, B = -1.455, *p = .000); Location results (β
= .088, B = .988, * p = .000); Case Mix Index results (β = .84, B = 1.450, * p = .000); RegionNorth East results (β = .125, B = 1.330, * p = .000); Region- South (β = .305, B = 3.707, * p =
.000); Region- Midwest (β = .225, B = 2.631 * p = .000).
The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of
Patient Experience were Region- West (β = .033, B = .641, p = .125); Hospital Ownership
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(DNonProfit) (β = -.008, B = -.086, p = .745); Teaching Intensity (β = .019, B = 1.192, p = .302
(appendix MHR- Table 18).
Table 22:Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Efficiency and Cost
Variable

β

DRegion1NE

β = -.332*

DRegion2S

β = -.374*

DRegion3MW

β = -.226*

DRegion4W

β = -.084*

Location

β = .145*

DPrivate

β = -.139*

DNonProfit

β = -.004

Teaching Intensity

β = -.005

Case Mix Index

β = -.166*

HospitalSize

β = -.165*

Final Model (1)
R2 = 20.6%

* statistically significant at 5% level
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Table 23: Hierarchical Regression DV 4 (Efficiency and Cost)

Model 0
(Constant)

Model 1

9.028

17.269

Region
DRegion1NE
DRegion2S
DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

-4.823
6.364
3.644
-2.78

-5.011
6.454
-3.77
-2.368

Location
Rural 1/Urban
0

3.946

2.317

-2.263
-0.327

-2.509
-0.057

Ownership
DPrivate
DNonProfit
Teaching
Intensity
Case Mix
Index
HospitalSize
R2
∆R2
F
∆F

-0.411
-4.054
-0.005
0.134
60.164
-

0.206
0..072
70.897
10.733

Where:
∆F = (R22 - R21 ) / (k2 - k1 )
___________________
(1-R22) / (N – k2 – 1)
F is statistically significant at 1% level (Appendix 3, table 78, F distribution critical values)
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R21 is the value of R2 for the first (smaller) model, R22 is the value of R2 for the second (larger)
model, k1 is the number of independent variables in the first model and k2 is the number of
independent variables in the second model (Miles & Shelvin, 2001, p. 37).

Multivariate Hierarchical Regression: Efficiency and Cost
All Independent variables were entered manually in the following order (Control
Variables), Region (DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DRegion2MW, DRegion4W), Location (Rural)
and Hospital Ownership (DPrivate and DNonProfit). The hierarchical multiple regression in
model 0, displayed, Region, Location and Hospital ownership contributed significantly to the
regression model, F (7, 2733) = 60.164, * p = .000) and accounted for 13.4% of the variation in
Efficiency and Cost (appendix MHR- Table 19, Table 20). Introducing the independent variables
in model 1 (Teaching intensity, Case Mix Index and Hospital size) explained an additional
20.6% of variation in Efficiency and Cost and this change in R2 was significant F (10, 2730) =
70.897, *p = .000.
The statistically significant variables were Region- North East, South, Midwest, West;
Location, Hospital ownership (DPrivate); Case Mix Index and Hospital size. With the South
region generating the most intense beta value (β = –.374, B = -6.454, *p = .000). North East
region with the second strongest beta (β = -.332, B = -5.011, *p = .000); Midwest region (β = .145, B = 2.317, * p = .000); Region- West (β = -0.84, B = -2.368, * p = .000); Location results
(β = .125, B = 1.330, * p = .000); Hospital Ownership (DPrivate) (β = -.139, B = -2.509, * p =
.000); Case mix index (β = -.166, B = -4.054 * p = .000), Hospital Size (β = -.165, B = -.005 * p
= .000)..
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The variables that were not statistically significant and which were not good predictors of
Efficiency and Cost were Hospital Ownership (DNonProfit) (β = -.004, B = -.057, p = .876);
Teaching Intensity (β = -.005, B = -.411, p = .798) (appendix MHR-Table 24).

IV.3 Result Summary
These results demonstrate a robust relationship between teaching intensity, hospital size
and CMI and our variables of interest. In the following section discussed the significance of our
results and provide an interpretation. Also discussed was the practical implications, limitations of
the study and suggestions for future directions.
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V

Chapter 5: Discussion

V.1 Discussion: Bivariate Analysis
In this section, a bivariate analysis was conducted, and the relationship between each IV
(teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index) on each DV (safety, clinical care, patient
experience, and efficiency and cost) was evaluated to determine disparities between the two
variables and whether results supported the existing literature.
IV1: Teaching Intensity
The analysis shows evidence that Teaching Intensity was a statistically significant
predictor of Safety (DV1), Clinical care (DV2), and Patient experience (DV3). However, this
did not hold for efficiency and cost (DV4). Results suggested that there was no association
between teaching intensity and efficiency and cost.
First, it was argued that teaching intensity influences safety. Teaching hospitals are
considered innovators, forward-thinkers, and have up-to-date best practice standards, as medical
residents are trained using the latest knowledge and concepts. Subsequently, this supports
hospital teaching as a significant positive predictor of patient safety. Positive collaboration and
teamwork in the healthcare system has proven to have successful outcomes on healthcare
quality. Teamwork has become a major focus in healthcare. The impetus for this new interest in
teamwork is the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report titled “To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health System”:
…which details the high rate of preventable medical errors, many of which are the result
of dysfunctional or nonexistent teamwork. The report suggests that teamwork requires
effective patient management because of the increased specialization of tasks, the
increased complexity and risks associated with treatment options, and the need to ensure
appropriate healthcare outcomes and patient safety. As the report states:
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…beyond their cost in human lives, preventable medical errors exact other significant
tolls, total costs of between $17 billion and $29 billion per year, loss of trust in the
health-care system by patients and diminished satisfaction by both patients and health
professionals (Piollon, 1999).
Results revealed that teaching intensity has a significant and negative influence on Safety
(DV1). Surprisingly, this finding does not agree with the literature (β= -.063, P=.001). As per
the results, it is understood that the more medical residents that are being trained at a given
hospital, patient safety is negatively impacted. It can be speculated that, instead of providers
focusing on patients, the focus may be diverted in an effort to impart knowledge while the actual
care of patients suffer. Further, it can also be speculated that in a teaching system perhaps the
frequency of medical residents around patients may increase the possibility of infections, simply
from proximity. Additionally, it can be assumed that there are weakened safety protocols at these
medical facilities and although teaching hospitals provide highly specialized care, distinct
guidelines have not been established to mitigate against patients’ risk of contracting infections.
Second, it was argued that teaching intensity influences clinical care. The literature
review supports the notion that teaching hospitals have lower mortality rates than non-teaching
hospitals, which is further supported by the findings of this study. Iterating that teaching
hospitals are said to be early adopters of technology and offer care that provides better
outcomes; these hospitals are often more experienced in the treatment of various conditions
(Datz, 2017).
The third argument was that teaching intensity influences patient experience. Today,
most teaching hospitals provide twenty-four-hour accessibility. Accessibility is one of the first
steps to creating satisfactory patient experience. Results revealed that teaching intensity has a
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significant and negative influence on patient experience (DV3). Interestingly, this finding does
not agree with the literature (β= -.52, P=.006).
Previous literature highlights that teaching intensity boosts patient experience.
Communication with nurses and doctors, responsiveness of hospital staff, communication about
medication, hospital cleanliness and quietness, discharge information, care transition, and
hospital overall rating all play a vital role interfacing with this measure. Newly trained medical
residents are usually the first in line to encounter and have any interaction with the patients.
Based on findings, it is understood that the higher the number of medical residents being
trained at a given hospital, patient experience is negatively impacted. It can be speculated that
the goal of healthcare providers is not to ensure that patients have a value-based experience
during hospital visits or stay but rather the focus is on teaching medical residents (junior
doctors). It can be presumed that hospitals with inexperienced trainees or shortage of senior staff
results in more disintegrated patient experience and decreased quality of care. Further, it can also
be speculated that teaching hospitals are larger and more solvent in nature, thus the focus is not
on providing a customer- centric environment but rather exemplary medical/treatment outcomes.
Finally, the results interpreted that teaching intensity does not influences efficiency and
cost. This result is supported by previous literature pointing out that teaching medical residents
negatively impact productivity of other hospital output, thereby raising cost or reducing revenue
(Grosskopf et al., 2001).
IV2: Hospital Size
First, results revealed hospital size has a significant and negative influence on safety
(DV1). Astonishingly, this finding does not support the literature (β= -.187, P=.000). As per
results, it is understood for every unit increase in hospital size, safety is being impacted
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negatively. It can be speculated that the larger a hospital’s capacity the less likely it is providers
will adhere to safety protocols, thus increasing the risk of patient infections. It can also be
presumed hospitals that are stretched beyond its capacity can cause frustration among physicians
having a negative impact on their productivity, which in turn impacts incentivization. Further, it
can be speculated that infections can easily be contracted from patient to patient due to
overcrowding. Having a safety culture to mitigate incidents that can be associated with patient
injuries and even cause death is a critical component of any healthcare facility.
Second, results revealed hospital size has a significant and positive influence on clinical
care. Like teaching hospitals, larger hospitals are generally considered to be heavily invested in
advanced technology, which in turn contributes to mitigating risk associated with clinical
care/mortality which is supported by the literature.
Third, results revealed hospital size has a significant and negative influence on patient
experience. Patient satisfaction has been seen as a key criterion when evaluating hospitals and is
one of the main focus of the current healthcare reform. There has been a large strand of
literature aimed at identifying the relationship between hospital structure and patient satisfaction
in developed countries. Most of these studies have shown higher staff‐to‐patient ratio and better
hospital environments were associated with higher patient rates (Linlin et al., 2019).
Interestingly, findings (β= -.295, P=.000) does not agree with previous literature. As per
results it can be understood for every unit increase in hospital size, patient experience is being
impacted negatively. This can be as a result of a very slow hospital system, meaning, as patients
go from one area to the next there is a lack of service within the hospital system. Leaders need
to optimize strategic alignment to allow a smoother and more efficient workflow which in turn
can have a positive impact on the patient experience. Additionally, satisfactory patient
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experience is one that involves a reasonable amount of communication between medical staff
and patients. It can be hypothesized that in larger hospitals, providers are thinly stretched and
will find it difficult to maintain the degree of contact required for the proper transmission of
information between the provider and the patient, as well as between the provider and the health
care administrators. Relevant information may be lost during the process, which may result in a
delay in care delivery. Also, confidentiality may be compromised as well as misdiagnosis of
care, or providers may be faced with complex decisions on whose life to save when not
everyone can be saved (triage approach).
Finally, results suggest hospital size has a significant and negative influence on efficiency
and cost. Hospital size has long been an area of discussion and debate in the U.S. healthcare
industry. Questions have consistently focused on cost management or efficiency in large versus
small hospitals. A persistent question among researchers is whether efficiencies are associated
with larger facilities through economies of scale or if there are alternate scenarios that play a
significant part in hospital efficiency and cost (Coyne et al.,2009). The results are consistent with
earlier publications.
IV3: Case Mix Index
Case Mixed Index considers the severity of the patient's condition and subsequent
treatment. This means that the more advanced a hospital is in terms of innovation and processes;
the more they are equipped to promote quality safety measures. An increase in survival rate,
provide satisfactory patient experience and increase efficiency and cost. Providers make it their
duty to report their CMI as this is a strong indicator of how well their institution is performing
financially.
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Results revealed case mix index has a significant and negative influence on safety and
efficiency and cost (DV1 and DV4). Surprisingly, this finding for DV1 does not support the
literature. As per the results, it is understood that the more severe cases handled by a hospital and
the variety of patients that are being dealt with, negatively impacts patient safety (β= -.0206,
P=.000). Based on the above discussion on hospital size and safety the same speculation for
findings on case mix index and safety can be used to explain the outcomes. In addition, the
literature supports efficiency and cost findings, with the case mix index having a significant and
negative influence on safety. The more severe cases are handled by a hospital, the more
resources are being used by that facility.
Finally, results revealed more severe cases handled by a hospital and the variety of
patients that are being dealt with, positively impacts clinical care and patient experience, these
two findings are supported by the literature.
V.2 Discussion: Multivariate Analysis
As a means of assessing the stability of bivariate findings a multivariate analysis on IVs
and DVs was conducted. Hence an evaluation was completed measuring the relationship
between all IVs (teaching intensity, hospital size, and case mix index) on each DV (safety,
clinical care, patient experience, and efficiency and cost) allowing for an inference on whether
the results back up existing literature.
Multivariate analysis presents a more unambiguous result among variables. Using
multivariate analysis helped identify certain characteristics among constructs quickly. This
analysis gave an overview of the associations between two or more variables.
In examining the influence above and beyond the first group of independent variables
(teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix index) and to statistically control for three
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variables (Region, location, and hospital ownership) a hierarchical linear regression was carried
out. This test examined whether adding variables significantly enhanced the model’s capability
to predict the criterion variable.
Multivariate Analysis: Safety
Results supported teaching intensity (IV1) has a statistically positive impact on safety
which is supported by previous literature. On the other hand, both the hospital size and the case
mix index have significant and negative impacts on safety, as can be seen in Table 16, and the
same speculations from bivariate safety results can be used to justify this result, since this is not
confirmed by the literature. (Hospital size: β= -.187, P=.000) (Case Mix Index β= -.0206,
P=.000).
Recall from the hierarchical analysis were four IVs that were statistically significant
predictors of safety: Region-West, location, case mix index and hospital size. The findings
supported the literature that rural hospitals in the western region that handle patients with severe
conditions produced better safety scores than hospitals in other regions. In December 2018, the
Leapfrog group conducted an annual hospital evaluation recognizing hospitals for excellence in
hospital quality, patient safety and efficiency in which seventeen rural hospitals in California
received awards (The 118 'Top Hospitals' in the US, according to The Leapfrog Group, 2018).
The IVs, Teaching intensity, hospital ownership (private and nonprofit) and the
Midwest, south and northeast regions were not significant predictors of safety. All listed IVs
have a negative association with safety. Results indicated that private and nonprofit hospital
scores were lower as opposed to government owned, rural medical facilities. This result is
substantiated since value-based purchasing is a Centers of Medicare and Medicaid services,
government run program.
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Multivariate Analysis: Clinical care
The multivariate analysis showed that teaching intensity, hospital size and case mix
index all have significant and positive impact on clinical care. This finding is supported in the
previous literature.
In reference to the hierarchical analysis, four IVs were statistically significant predictors
of clinical care: Region-West and South; location, case mix index, and hospital ownership.
Results indicated that rural hospitals in the western and southern regions have the lowest
mortality scores. This is no surprise as Florida and California were the top two hospitals
rewarded as announced by Health Leaders media report for FY 2018. The IVs, Teaching
intensity and region Northeast and Midwest are not significant predictors of clinical care (The
118 'Top Hospitals' in the US, according to The Leapfrog Group, 2018).
Multivariate Analysis: Patient Experience
The multivariate analysis showed that teaching intensity and hospital size had a
statistical and negative impact on patient experience. This can be seen in Table 16 and this can
draw upon the same speculations from the bivariate findings as it relates to safety since this
finding is not supported in the literature (Teaching Intensity: β= -.011, P=.000) (Hospital Size
β= -.295, P=.000). In addition, case mix index exhibited a statistical and positive impact on
patient experience. This finding is supported by previous literature.
As per the hierarchical analysis, five IVs were statistically significant predictors of
patient experience: Region-Northeast, South, Midwest; location and hospital ownership- Private,
case mix index, and hospital size. Results revealed that rural, private hospitals in the northeast,
south, and Midwest region had more satisfactory patient experience scores. Public hospitals are
funded by the Government and are guided by governmental rules and regulations, while private
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hospitals are not bound by the same and offer more personalized care and treatment to their
patients. Moreover, private hospitals have more money to maintain patients and offer the best
quality of service than their counterparts.
Numerous comparative studies have suggested the differences in healthcare services
provided by private hospitals result in higher rates of patient satisfaction. Results of this study
shows that patients prefer to visit private over public hospitals because of multiple factors such
as improved technology, reduced wait time and delay in treatment, sterile environment, and
personalized care from physician and nurses (Irfan & Ijaz, 2011). In systems where private
hospitals are not funded by public financing, they are more directed towards earning profits by
focusing on service quality, hence, patients search for private care only because of perceptions
of better facilities and excellence (Fatima, Malik, & Shabbir, 2018). The IVs, Teaching
intensity, and Region-western and hospital ownership (nonprofit) are not significant predictors
of patient experience. Although the Western region delivered on having favorable safety and
clinical care scores, it is patient experience scores being impacted negatively. This can be as a
result of government owned healthcare facilities. Previous studies have also indicated that
patients select private hospitals only because they are not satisfied with public healthcare
providers. They are compelled to spend more money in order to get desired service quality
(Fatima, Malik, & Shabbir, 2018).
Multivariate Analysis: Efficiency and cost
The multivariate analysis showed that hospital size and case mix index had a statistical
and negative impact on efficiency and cost (Hospital Size: β= -.213, P=.000) (Case Mix Index
β= -.147, P=.000). This finding is supported by the literature. In addition, the results from
teaching intensity revealed a statistical and positive impact on efficiency and cost. This finding
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is not supported in the literature. It can be speculated that healthcare administrators plan and
budget medical residents teaching and training in accordance with efficient usage of resources
(teaching intensity decreases efficiency and cost). Another factor to be considered is the
allocation of insufficient time for medical training that can lead to an over utilization of
resources. For example, overtime and unplanning trainings of medical residents may maximize
associated cost.
In reference to hierarchical analysis, there were five IVs that were statistically significant
predictors to efficiency and cost: Region-Northeast, South, Midwest, and West; location and
hospital ownership- Private, case mix index, and hospital size. Results suggested throughout all
regions, there were satisfactory efficiency and cost results. These results are more prevalent
among hospitals that handle and treat severe medical conditions.
The IVs, Teaching intensity, and hospital ownership (nonprofit) were not significant
predictors of Efficiency and cost. Through the analysis of the study, it was observed that
teaching intensity had a negative impact on efficiency and cost. Again, this can be based on the
result of physicians spending more time and resources training residents than attending patients.
V.3 Discussion Summary
The findings endorsed the starting assumptions. The study was aimed at exploring and
making a comparative review of bivariate and multivariate data processing. The comparison
between bivariate and multivariate approach in this study revealed a smaller number of
significant independent variables with multivariate analysis. As a researcher, the bivariate and
multivariate methods must be used as complementary methods, as they are not equivalent in all
cases.
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Based on the Bivariate analysis (Tables 9-12) all relationships between all independent
variables (IV 1- IV3) with dependent variables (DV 1- DV4) were statistically significant except
for the relationship between Teaching intensity and efficiency and cost (DV1 and DV4). In
assessing the collective effect of independent variables, after conducting multivariate analysis
predictably all relationships were statistically significant. As a result, the research question was
answered, and the null hypotheses was rejected.
The motivations for this study were high cost-low quality in healthcare, organizational
inefficiencies, and healthcare access. The U.S. healthcare delivery system has endured numerous
changes over the past few decades in an effort to making healthcare affordable for all.
Healthcare accessibility. As per the findings, hospital size has a significant and positive
influence on clinical care, implying that the larger a hospital the greater the survival rate of
patients. This shows that accessibility to healthcare for acute and complex conditions is vital to
achieving the best outcomes for citizens. The U.S. healthcare system must be able to
accommodate citizens for entry into the care system without barriers. Ideally, all hospitals
(government, private etc.) should be competent in terms of its structure, process, and outcomes;
striving to allow access and deliver quality of care for all. The impetus is on policy makers to
design and implement national healthcare programs that will allow access to all citizens no
matter race or socio-economic status.
Organizational Inefficiencies. Successful patient experience and safety measures are related to
major efficient clinical processes and outcomes. Organizational inefficiencies impede the entire
healthcare delivery process. Long hospital stays, poor collaboration among medical staff and
hospital administrators as well as shortage of staff aid in impeding proper patient care. As per
the findings, hospital size negatively correlates with safety and patient experience. It is with
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urgent need for policy makers to implement clear, strategic alignments for healthcare
sustainability and to seal loopholes that are experienced during inpatients care.
High Cost- Low Quality. Patient experience assessments can expose major system issues, such
as delays in returning test results and communication deficiencies that can have wide impacts on
quality, safety, and overall performance. The study showed that teaching hospitals have a
statistical negative correlation with patient experience. While teaching hospitals have the best in
innovation and more financial resources available the focus of quality seems to be diminishing.
As opposed to other industrialized countries the US has an imbalance healthcare system, where
high cost- low quality is prevalent across all States. The economic and social benefits are
obvious, and there is a need to concentrate even more on investing and enhancing quality in
order to build faith in the healthcare system which, can be achieved only through access to highquality, people-centered health services for all (Wilson, Hartl, & Palan, 2018).
V.4 Practical implication
This research has contributed as an empirical model for hospital performance that
assesses healthcare institutions and patients' scores with respect to quality maintenance;
moreover, it presents findings that allow for successful implementation and sustainability of
value-based care and operations within the healthcare system. Subsequently, this study is
beneficial to policymakers, hospital administrators, medical professionals, and researchers; it
can also be useful for any business association. Additionally, this study adds to the body of
knowledge by evaluating each measure of the value-based purchasing program and learning
about other factors that influence quality care, the structure, process, and outcome. This research
also highlights that government-owned hospitals can successfully increase their customer
fulfillment measures by addressing elements that can produce immediate and improved patient
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satisfaction.
V.5 Limitation and future research
Further research can be conducted to address data gathering approaches and accuracy.
Notwithstanding the limitations of researchers and industry experts in carrying out timely studies
reflecting emerging medical changes and program adjustments, the gaps identified in the
literature demonstrate that there are critical areas of VBP programs that still need to be
evaluated. Public reporting on value-based purchasing systems use measures of quality based on
averages or rankings of observed quality scores (Blumenthal, 2013). These methods provide a
limited amount of information on how well hospitals are performing (Med-dings and McMahon
2008). A method that provides information about how closely each hospital approaches its own
best possible quality scores (alternatively, best possible outcomes) could provide additional
information, especially to payers (Unruh & Hofler, 2016).
Furthermore, over the years, the measures of the value-based purchasing program have
been modified frequently. This does not allow for a consistent performance assessment of
hospitals. Also, the value-based purchasing measure should not be the same across hospitals as
each hospital has its own characteristics. Possibly, medical facilities should be grouped
according to their characteristics and, on this basis, be incentivized accordingly. For this
incentive specifically (VBP), only the results of Medicare patients should be accounted for in the
patient experience measure. The HCAHPS (hospital consumer assessment of healthcare
providers and systems) survey is not restricted to Medicare beneficiaries. The random sample
selection should consist of only Medicare recipients, as unbiased selection may inflate patient
experience scores. In order to refine the program, it will be extremely advantageous to know how
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their overall hospital visit impacts this group Medicare beneficiaries (Hospital Patient - Survey
of patients' experiences (HCAHPS), 2020).
The efficiency and cost measure needs to be revised. Currently, efficiency and cost are
measured by the Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary (MSPB), which shows how much Medicare
spends on a particular episode per patient. These only measures cost, that pinpoints to the
limitation of the VBP program, which fails to measure efficiency or at the very least define
efficiency in a measurable manner. A more suitable tool, such as applying a cost performance
index (CPI), would be more favorable. The CPI is one of the key indicators of the earned value
management system. This index can be applied to evaluate the value of care. Output measured:
the amount of completed work for every unit of cost spent.
The current study is focused on healthcare and a government-run program; however, future
studies can be done to evaluate similar private sector programs in other industries. In addition, an
exploratory qualitative study assessing reward programs would be value-added to the body of
existing literature.
V.6 Conclusion
An exploratory analysis was paramount to this research as the identification of gaps in the
body of literature emphasized the need for the applied methodology. Multiple value-based
purchasing programs run concurrently within hospitals that may have impacted hospital
performance in areas yet to be recognized.
As mentioned in the literature review the concept of value in the health care system plays
a key role in medical practice. The concept of value refers to the output achieved relative to the
cost incurred in which, value is defined as the patient health outcomes achieved per dollar spent
(Porter, 2010). In measuring hospital performance value-based purchasing uses the following six
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strategies: 1) collecting information and data on quality, 2) selective contracting with highquality plans or providers, 3) partnering with plans or providers to improve quality, 4) promoting
Six-Sigma quality - streamlining quality control, 5) educating consumers on quality issues, and
6) rewarding or penalizing plans or providers through use of incentives or disincentives ( (Maio,
Goldfarb, & Carter, 2003).
In reviewing the literature and industry practices in hospital performance in relation to
value-based purchasing programs the following gaps were identified:
Data Quality Assurance. Value-based purchasing measures result from the collection of data by
hospitals. Data quality is vital to incentives and disincentives management and distribution. The
body of the literature lacks studies on hospital data collection procedures and reporting
techniques. A review and assessment of data quality management in hospital information
gathering would serve to identify inconsistencies across hospital reporting and promote
standardization, as recommended in limitation this should done by grouping hospitals according
to their characteristics. Basic questions remain about whether value-based purchasing have
improved quality and efficiency for Medicare (Ryan, 2013); given the lack of research-based
support for data quality assurance, this raises questions about the mechanism used to determine a
hospital's chances of being unfairly incentivized or penalized.
Studies on selection of plans and providers. There is a lack of transparency in selecting plans
and providers who participate in value-based purchasing programs. Limited academic and
technical research that addresses the selection process should be of concern. Research is needed
to determine whether participating insurance plans are helpful to patients. Lack of research in
this area can serve as evidence of a lack of awareness of how patient care is influenced by
insurance schemes and their relationships with providers. Health insurers, like other insurance
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schemes, seek to save a dollar at every turn, and while the value in care is promoted as the basis
for VBP programs, financial rewards are still a heavily motivating factor in hospital data
reporting.
Multiple Value-Based Purchasing Programs. After years of small-scale pilot projects,
demonstrations, and experiments, the Affordable Care Act mandated that Medicare
payment to hospitals and physicians must depend, in part, on metrics of quality and efficiency
(Ryan, 2013). However, VBP involve many programs that operate simultaneously. The literature
does not speak to the monitoring of these programs that raises the question of how the programs
affect each other. The monitoring of each program and the overall impact on hospital
performance would support and promote VBP programs, as monitoring optimizes hospital
operations through structural management; thus, promotes the achievement of the VBP
objective, which is financial incentives to improve quality and efficiency (Ryan, 2013).
As U.S. health care systems moved toward a value-based and patient-centred approach in
response to high costs and low-quality health care, accompanying scholarly and sectoral
publications have followed. Literature on hospital Value-Based Purchasing programs concentrate
on broadening readers' awareness of VBP programs, reviewing performance measures, assessing
hospital operations, highlighting impacts of VBP programs, and reviewing and recommending
policy reforms to meet emerging needs of the medical community. One can argue that the
relatively narrow scope that the body of literature covers could be attributed to the complexities
of value-based purchasing programs. Readjustments to VBP programs in hospitals pose a
challenge for academics and industry experts to study and produce relevant content across the
wide range of VBP programs.
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The purpose of this study was to understand the factors that influence hospital
performance, i.e., safety, clinical care, patient experience, efficiency and cost as measured by
teaching intensity, hospital size and the case mix index. The findings showed that there exists a
significant impact on hospital performance, which correlates with previous studies. The literature
has made it clear that while rewards can significantly boost quality patient care, stakeholders
must understand and agree that quality care will not be achieved without obstacles and openness
to reforming policies and practices.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Table 25: Correlation between variables in this study.

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2- tailed).
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Appendix 2
Simple Regression Model 1

Table 26
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.063a

R Square
.004

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.614983

Adjusted R Square
.004

a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Table 27

ANOVAa
1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
322.805

df
1

Mean Square
322.805

Residual

81027.062

2570

31.528

Total

81349.867

2571

F
10.239

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Sig.
.001b
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Table 28
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
11.124
.112
Teaching Intensity
-4.325
1.352
-.063
a. Dependent Variable: Safety

1

t

Sig.

99.151
-3.200

.000
.001

Table 29
Model Summary
Model
1

R
.295a

R Square
.087

Adjusted R
Square
.087

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.375998

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Table 30

1

ANOVAa
Model
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
Regression
7073.389
1
7073.389
Residual

74276.478

2570

Total

81349.867

2571

F
244.742

28.901

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Sig.
.000b
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Table 31
Coefficientsa

1

Model
(Constant)
HospitalSize

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
13.001
.163
-.007
.000

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.295

t
79.813
-15.644

Sig.
.000
.000

a. Dependent Variable: Safety

Table 32
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.304a

R Square
.093

Adjusted R Square
.092

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.352163

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 33

1

Model
Regression
Residual
Total

ANOVAa
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
7500.457
1
7500.457
73447.455
2564
28.646
80947.912

2565

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

F
261.836

Sig.
.000b
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Table 34
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
21.342
.644
Case Mix Index
-6.293
.389
-.304

1

t
33.143
-16.181

Sig.
.000
.000

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
Simple Regression Model 2
Table 35
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.045a

R Square
.002

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.996908

Adjusted R Square
.002

a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity
Table 36
ANOVAa

1

Model
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
135.584
67566.347
67701.932

df
1
2706
2707

Mean Square
135.584
24.969

F
5.430

Sig.
.020b

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Table 37
Coefficientsa

1

Model
(Constant)

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
13.817
.097

t
142.324

Sig.
.000

96

Teaching Intensity

3.009

1.291

.045

2.330

.020

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
Table 38

Model Summary

Model
1

R
.179a

R Square
.032

Adjusted R Square
.032

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.920632

a. Predictors: (Constant), Hospital Size

Table 39
ANOVAa
1

Model
Sum of Squares
Regression
2159.704

df
1

Mean Square
2159.704
24.213

Residual

65543.549

2707

Total

67703.253

2708

F
89.197

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Table 40
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients
1

Model
(Constant)
HospitalSize

Standardized
Coefficients

B
12.856

Std. Error
.141

Beta

t
90.862

Sig.
.000

.004

.000

.179

9.444

.000

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
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Table 41
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.232a

R Square
.054

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.865979

Adjusted R Square
.053

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 42
ANOVAa

1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
3626.695

df
1

Mean Square
3626.695

Residual

64024.639

2704

23.678

Total

67651.334

2705

F
153.169

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index
Table 43
Coefficientsa

1

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
7.420
.528
Case Mix Index
4.007
.324
.232

t
14.061
12.376

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care

Sig.
.000
.000
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Simple Regression Model 3
Table 44
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.052a

R Square
.003

Adjusted R Square
.002

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.048988

a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Table 45
ANOVAa
Model
Regression

1

Sum of Squares
194.227

df
1

Mean Square
194.227

Residual

70690.086

2773

25.492

Total

70884.313

2774

F
7.619

Sig.
.006b

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity
Table 46
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
1

Model
(Constant)
Teaching Intensity

B
9.152

Std. Error
.097

Beta

t
94.316

Sig.
.000

-3.351

1.214

-.052

-2.760

.006

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b.
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Table 47

Model Summary

Model
1

R
.294a

Adjusted R
Square
.086

R Square
.086

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.840182

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Table 48
ANOVAa

1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
6138.734

df
1

Mean Square
6138.734

Residual

64987.504

2774

23.427

Total

71126.238

2775

F
262.033

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Table 49
Coefficientsa

1

Model
(Constant)
HospitalSize

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
10.772
.138
-.006
.000

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.294

t
78.334
-16.187

Sig.
.000
.000
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a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience

Table 50
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.152a

R Square
.023

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.996847

Adjusted R Square
.023

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 51
ANOVAa
1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
1635.949

df
1

Mean Square
1635.949

Residual

69087.789

2767

24.968

Total

70723.738

2768

F
65.521

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 52
Coefficientsa

1

Model
(Constant)
Case Mix Index

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
13.342
.532
-2.635
.326

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.152

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience

t
25.067
-8.094

Sig.
.000
.000
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Simple Regression Model 4
Table 53

Model Summary
Model
1

R
.015a

Adjusted R
Square
.000

R Square
.000

Std. Error of the
Estimate
7.121887

a. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Table 54
ANOVAa

1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
33.547

df
1

Mean Square
33.547

Residual

141106.602

2782

50.721

Total

141140.150

2783

F
.661

Sig.
.416b

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), Teaching Intensity

Table 55
Coefficientsa

1

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
5.367
.137
Teaching Intensity
-1.393
1.712
-.015

t
39.275
-.813

Sig.
.000
.416
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a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost

Table 56
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.284a

R Square
.081

Std. Error of the
Estimate
6.827771

Adjusted R Square
.081

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize

Table 57
ANOVAa
1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
11422.623

df
1

Mean Square
11422.623

Residual

129739.148

2783

46.618

Total

141161.771

2784

F
245.024

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize
Table 58
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients
1

Model
(Constant)
HospitalSize

Standardized
Coefficients

B
7.605

Std. Error
.194

Beta

t
39.283

Sig.
.000

-.008

.001

-.284

-15.653

.000

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
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Table 59
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.253a

R Square
.064

Adjusted R Square
.064

Std. Error of the
Estimate
6.896473

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 60
ANOVAa

1

Model
Regression

Sum of Squares
9019.573

df
1

Mean Square
9019.573

Residual

132030.296

2776

47.561

Total

141049.869

2777

F
189.641

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index

Table 61
Coefficientsa

Unstandardized Coefficients
1

Standardized
Coefficients

Model
(Constant)

B
15.270

Std. Error
.732

Beta

t
20.869

Sig.
.000

Case Mix Index

-6.168

.448

-.253

-13.771

.000

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
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Appendix 3
Multivariate Analysis
Table 62
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.343a

R Square
.118

Adjusted R Square
.117

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.280030

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching
Intensity, Hospital Size
Table 63
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
9522.642

df

Mean Square
3
3174.214

Residual

71425.270

2562

Total

80947.912

2565

F
113.858

Sig.
.000b

27.879

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size

Table 64
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
19.227
.688
Teaching Intensity
.075
1.295
.001
HospitalSize
-.004
.001
-.187
Case Mix Index
-4.250
.457
-.206
a. Dependent Variable: Safety

t
27.940
.058
-8.510
-9.301

Sig.
.000
.954
.000
.000
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Multivariate Analysis # 2
Table 65
Model Summary

Model
1

R
a

.240

R Square
Adjusted R Square
.057
.056

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.857819

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching
Intensity, Hospital Size
Table 66
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
3888.448

df

Mean Square
3
1296.149

Residual

63762.886

2702

Total

67651.334

2705

F
54.925

Sig.
.000b

23.598

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size
Table 67
Coefficients
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
8.144
.573
Teaching Intensity
.100
1.276
.001
HospitalSize
.002
.000
.074
Case Mix Index
3.298
.389
.191
a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care

t
14.218
.078
3.319
8.477

Sig.
.000
.938
.001
.000
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Multivariate Analysis # 3
Table 68
Model Summary

Model
1

R
a

.293

R Square
.086

Adjusted R Square
.085

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.834836

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size

Table 69
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
6090.104

df

Mean Square
3
2030.035

Residual

64633.634

2765

Total

70723.738

2768

F
86.844

Sig.
.000b

23.376

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size
Table 70
Coefficients
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
Beta
1
(Constant)
10.576
.556
Teaching Intensity
-.687
1.184
-.011
HospitalSize
-.006
.000
-.295
Case Mix Index
.124
.375
.007
a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience

t
19.033
-.580
-13.735
.331

Sig.
.000
.562
.000
.741
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Multivariate Analysis #4
Table 71
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.312

a

R Square
.097

Adjusted R Square
.096

Std. Error of the
Estimate
6.775126

a. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, HospitalSize

Table 72
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
13716.793

df

Mean Square
3
4572.264

Residual

127333.076

2774

Total

141049.869

2777

F
99.609

Sig.
.000b

45.902

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), Case Mix Index, Teaching Intensity, Hospital Size

Table 73
Coefficients

Model
1
(Constant)
Teaching Intensity
Hospital Size
Case Mix Index

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
12.763
.776
3.777
1.659
-.006
.001
-3.586
.524

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.042
-.213
-.147

t
16.456
2.277
-9.972
-6.844

Sig.
.000
.023
.000
.000

108

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
Multi Collinearity
Table 74
Coefficientsa

Model
1

Unstandardized

Standardized

Collinearity

Coefficients

Coefficients

Statistics

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

19.227

.688

.075

1.295

-.004
-4.250

Teaching

Beta

t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

27.940

.000

.001

.058

.954

.963

1.038

.001

-.187

-8.510

.000

.717

1.396

.457

-.206

-9.301

.000

.705

1.418

Intensity
HospitalSize
Case Mix Index

a. Dependent Variable: Safety

Table 75
Coefficientsa

Model
1

Unstandardized

Standardized

Collinearity

Coefficients

Coefficients

Statistics

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

8.144

.573

Teaching

.100

1.276

.002
3.298

Beta

t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

14.218

.000

.001

.078

.938

.967

1.034

.000

.074

3.319

.001

.696

1.436

.389

.191

8.477

.000

.690

1.448

Intensity
HospitalSize
Case Mix Index

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
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Table 76
Coefficientsa

Model
1

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
(Constant)
Teaching

Std. Error

10.576

.556

-.687

1.184

-.006
.124

Beta

Collinearity Statistics
t

Sig.

Tolerance

VIF

19.033

.000

-.011

-.580

.562

.964

1.037

.000

-.295

-13.735

.000

.714

1.400

.375

.007

.331

.741

.706

1.417

Intensity
HospitalSize
Case Mix Index

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience

Table 77
Coefficientsa
Standardiz
ed
Unstandardized
Coefficient
Coefficients
s
Model
1
(Constant)
Teaching
Intensity
HospitalSize
Case Mix
Index

B
Std. Error
12.763
.776
3.777
1.659
-.006
-3.586

.001
.524

Beta

t
16.456
.042 2.277

Sig.
.000
.023

-.213 -9.972
-.147 -6.844

.000
.000

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost

Collinearity
Statistics
Toleranc
e
VIF
.964

1.037

.714
.705

1.401
1.418
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Table 78- F Distribution Critical Values
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Multivariate Hierarchical Regression Tables
MHR- Table 1
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.182

a

R Square
.033

Adjusted R Square
.031

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.529533

a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion4W,
DRegion2S, DPrivate, DRegion3MW
MHR- Table 2
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
2656.829

df
7

Mean Square
379.547
30.576

Residual

77326.039

2529

Total

79982.868

2536

F
12.413

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion4W, DRegion2S, DPrivate,
DRegion3MW
MHR- Table 3
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
12.580
.450
DRegion1NE
-.150
.352
DRegion2S
.113
.392
DRegion3MW
.344
.375
DRegion4W
.773
.510
Location
-2.158
.258
DPrivate
.442
.392
DNonProfit
-.147
.330

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.013
.008
.026
.036
-.168
.031
-.012

t
27.979
-.427
.288
.919
1.515
-8.377
1.129
-.444

Sig.
.000
.670
.773
.358
.130
.000
.259
.657
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a. Dependent Variable: Safety
MHR- Table 4

Model Summary

Model
1

R
.359

a

R Square
.129

Adjusted R Square
.126

Std. Error of the
Estimate
5.251346

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion2S, Teaching Intensity, DRegion4W,
DPrivate, Location, DRegion3MW, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE

MHR- Table 5
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
10324.280

df
10

Mean Square
1032.428
27.577

Residual

69658.588

2526

Total

79982.868

2536

F
37.439

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Safety
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion2S, Teaching Intensity, DRegion4W, DPrivate,
Location, DRegion3MW, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE

113

MHR- Table 6
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Coefficients

Std. Error
19.711

.818

-.380

.345

DRegion2S

.149

DRegion3MW

Beta

t

Sig.

24.103

.000

-.032

-1.102

.271

.381

.011

.391

.696

.171

.364

.013

.468

.640

DRegion4W

1.199

.487

.055

2.462

.014

Location

-.733

.260

-.057

-2.824

.005

DPrivate

.144

.377

.010

.382

.702

DNonProfit

.057

.317

.005

.181

.856

Teaching Intensity

.051

1.325

.001

.039

.969

-4.339

.488

-.210

-8.883

.000

-.004

.001

-.167

-7.357

.000

DRegion1NE

Case Mix Index
HospitalSize

a. Dependent Variable: Safety

MHR- Table 7
Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
.257

a

.066

Adjusted R Square
.063

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.826687

a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S,
DPrivate, DRegion3MW
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MHR- Table 8
ANOVAa
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
4375.017
61969.782
66344.799

df
7
2660

Mean Square
625.002
23.297

F
26.828

Sig.
.000b

2667

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate,
DRegion3MW

MHR- Table 9
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error
11.925

.385

-.367

.314

-1.765

DRegion3MW

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

30.952

.000

-.035

-1.171

.242

.341

-.146

-5.173

.000

-.440

.333

-.038

-1.323

.186

DRegion4W

-.653

.448

-.033

-1.458

.145

Location

1.784

.213

.161

8.361

.000

DPrivate

1.399

.327

.111

4.275

.000

DNonProfit

1.568

.277

.149

5.670

.000

DRegion1NE
DRegion2S

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
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MHR- Table 10
Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
a

.309

.096

Adjusted R Square
.092

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.751717

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate,
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE

MHR- Table 11
ANOVAa
Model
1

Regression

Sum of Squares
6352.894

df
10

Mean Square
635.289
22.579

Residual

59991.904

2657

Total

66344.799

2667

F
28.137

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care
b. Predictors: (Constant), Hospital Size, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, Location,
DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE
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MHR- Table 12
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
8.301
.689
-.175
.318
-1.634
.344
-.310
.334
-.851
.443
1.036
.225
1.468
.325
1.418
.275
.481
1.280
2.311
.415
.002
.000

Model
1
(Constant)
DRegion1NE
DRegion2S
DRegion3MW
DRegion4W
Location
DPrivate
DNonProfit
Teaching Intensity
Case Mix Index
HospitalSize

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.017
-.136
-.027
-.043
.093
.117
.135
.007
.134
.075

t
12.039
-.550
-4.753
-.926
-1.920
4.605
4.515
5.164
.376
5.570
3.286

Sig.
.000
.582
.000
.354
.055
.000
.000
.000
.707
.000
.001

a. Dependent Variable: Clinical Care

MHR- Table 13
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.297

a

R Square
.088

Adjusted R Square
.086

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.794826

a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S,
DPrivate, DRegion3MW
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MHR- Table 14
Model
1
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
6078.110
62602.741
68680.851

ANOVAa
df
7
2723
2730

Mean Square
868.301
22.990

F
37.768

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate,
DRegion3MW

MHR- Table 15

Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error
7.340

.339

.771

.299

DRegion2S

3.186

DRegion3MW

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

21.660

.000

.073

2.574

.010

.328

.262

9.719

.000

2.270

.319

.194

7.126

.000

.711

.434

.036

1.639

.101

Location

1.626

.211

.145

7.709

.000

DPrivate

-1.035

.322

-.082

-3.219

.001

-.086

.272

-.008

-.315

.753

DRegion1NE

DRegion4W

DNonProfit

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
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MHR- Table 16
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.408

a

R Square
.166

Adjusted R Square
.163

Std. Error of the
Estimate
4.588646

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W,
Teaching Intensity, DPrivate, Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index,
DNonProfit, DRegion1NE

MHR- Table 17
ANOVAa
Model
1
Regression

Sum of Squares
11409.422

df
10

Mean Square
1140.942
21.056

Residual

57271.428

2720

Total

68680.851

2730

F
54.187

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate,
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE
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MHR- Table 18
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

6.690

.681

DRegion1NE

1.330

.295

DRegion2S

3.707

DRegion3MW

Coefficients
Beta

Sig.
t
9.821

.000

.125

4.505

.000

.321

.305

11.555

.000

2.631

.311

.225

8.451

.000

DRegion4W

.641

.417

.033

1.536

.125

Location

.988

.216

.088

4.571

.000

DPrivate

-1.455

.311

-.115

-4.671

.000

DNonProfit

-.086

.263

-.008

-.326

.745

Teaching Intensity

1.192

1.155

.019

1.032

.302

Case Mix Index

1.450

.387

.084

3.743

.000

HospitalSize

-.007

.000

-.326

-15.216

.000

a. Dependent Variable: Patient Experience

MHR- Table 19
Model Summary

Model
1

R

R Square
.365

a

Adjusted R Square
.134

.131

Std. Error of the Estimate
6.655858

a. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S,
DPrivate, DRegion3MW
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MHR- Table 20
ANOVAa
Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

F

18657.014

7

2665.288

Residual

121073.109

2733

44.300

Total

139730.123

2740

Sig.

60.164

.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), DNonProfit, DRegion4W, Location, DRegion1NE, DRegion2S, DPrivate,
DRegion3MW
MHR- Table 21
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B
(Constant)

Std. Error
9.028

.469

DRegion1NE

-4.823

.414

DRegion2S

-6.364

DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

Coefficients
Beta

t

Sig.

19.254

.000

-.319

-11.643

.000

.454

-.368

-14.033

.000

-3.644

.441

-.219

-8.263

.000

-2.780

.601

-.099

-4.621

.000

Location

3.946

.292

.247

13.492

.000

DPrivate

-2.263

.445

-.126

-5.089

.000

-.327

.376

-.022

-.870

.384

DNonProfit

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
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MHR- Table 22
Model Summary

Model
1

R
.454a

R Square
.206

Adjusted R
Square
.203

Std. Error of the Estimate
6.374278

a. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity,
DPrivate, Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE

MHR- Table 23
Model
1
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
28806.335
110923.789
139730.123

ANOVAa
df
10
2730
2740

Mean Square
2880.633
40.631

F
70.897

Sig.
.000b

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
b. Predictors: (Constant), HospitalSize, DRegion3MW, DRegion4W, Teaching Intensity, DPrivate,
Location, DRegion2S, Case Mix Index, DNonProfit, DRegion1NE
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MHR- Table 24
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
Model
1
(Constant)

B
17.269

Std. Error
.941

DRegion1NE

-5.011

.409

DRegion2S

-6.454

DRegion3MW
DRegion4W

t
18.349

Sig.
.000

-.332

-12.258

.000

.444

-.374

-14.534

.000

-3.770

.431

-.226

-8.743

.000

-2.368

.579

-.084

-4.092

.000

Location

2.317

.300

.145

7.728

.000

DPrivate

-2.509

.431

-.139

-5.820

.000

DNonProfit

-.057

.364

-.004

-.156

.876

Teaching Intensity

-.411

1.604

-.005

-.256

.798

-4.054

.536

-.166

-7.561

.000

-.005

.001

-.165

-7.878

.000

Case Mix Index
HospitalSize

Beta

a. Dependent Variable: Efficiency and Cost
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